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Unbundling Constitutionality 
Richard Primus† 
Constitutional theory features a persistent controversy over the source or 
sources of constitutional status, that is, over the criteria that qualify some rules as 
constitutional rules. This Article contends that no single criterion characterizes all 
of the rules that American law treats as constitutional, such that it is a mistake to 
think of constitutionality as a status with necessary conditions. It is better to think 
of constitutionality on a bundle-of-sticks model: different attributes associated with 
constitutionality might or might not be present in any constitutional rule. Analysts 
should often direct their attention more to the separate substantive properties that 
are associated with constitutionality than to the question of constitutional status 
itself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article is about constitutionality. Not surprisingly, that 
concept pervades the field we call constitutional law. We de-
scribe United States v Windsor1 as a constitutional case, free 
speech as a constitutional principle,2 and reverse incorporation 
as a constitutional doctrine.3 When the President appoints agen-
cy heads while the Senate is in pro forma session, we say that 
his actions raise “constitutional issues” or “constitutional con-
cerns.”4 But what are we saying about these cases, principles, 
doctrines, issues, and concerns when we describe them as 
constitutional?5 
 
 1 133 S Ct 2675 (2013). 
 2 See, for example, Virginia v Black, 538 US 343, 359 (2003).  
 3 See Peter J. Rubin, Taking Its Proper Place in the Constitutional Canon: Bolling 
v. Sharpe, Korematsu, and the Equal Protection Component of Fifth Amendment Due 
Process, 92 Va L Rev 1879, 1882–83 (2006) (describing the reverse incorporation doc-
trine). 
 4 See Noel Canning v NLRB, 705 F3d 490, 493 (DC Cir 2013); Matthew C. Ste-
phenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers without a Senate Con-
firmation Vote?, 122 Yale L J 940, 942–44 (2013). 
 5 “Constitutional” is here the opposite of “nonconstitutional,” not the opposite of 
“unconstitutional.” To say that a rule is “constitutional” in the sense in which that term 
is opposed to “unconstitutional” is merely to say that the rule is constitutionally permit-
ted. In the sense in which the term is opposed to “nonconstitutional,” a rule is 
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Characterizing a rule as constitutional might mean that it 
appears in the written Constitution. It might mean that the rule 
prevails in conflicts with other kinds of rules, that it cannot be 
changed by ordinary legislation, or that it can be enforced by 
courts even in the face of contrary action by other officials. It 
might mean that the rule concerns the structure of government, 
that it protects a fundamental American value, or that it enjoys 
a sacred status in American society. In one sense or another, all 
of the foregoing meanings point to attributes of constitutionality. 
But theorists disagree about the relationships among those at-
tributes, and they disagree in particular about what entitles a 
rule to constitutional status in the first place. Often, the disa-
greement seems to concern the fundamental question of what 
qualifies a rule for constitutional status in something like—let’s 
say for now—a legally authoritative sense. 
The running disagreement about the basis for constitutional 
status often focuses on the role of the document we call the Con-
stitution. In one family of views, a rule is constitutional if and 
only if it appears in, or at least derives from, the text of that 
document.6 If a rule is textually grounded, it enjoys constitu-
tional status, and it is entitled to the privileged treatment that 
other attributes of constitutionality specify. A constitutional rule 
prevails in conflicts with nonconstitutional rules, is entrenched 
against change through ordinary legislation, and can be enforced 
by courts exercising the power of judicial review. Those are the 
payoffs of constitutional status, and textuality is the criterion. 
This, in capsule form, is one important approach to constitution-
ality. It has gone by different names at different times, including 
“interpretivism”7 and then, more accurately, “textualism.”8 An 
 
“constitutional” if it is one of the rules in light of which other rules are permitted or not. 
So, to use an example, “Congress may levy taxes on incomes” is an example of a constitu-
tional rule in the sense relevant for this paper. “Capital gains income is subject to a 15% 
tax” is an example of a constitutional rule in the other sense. It is a rule permitted by 
constitutional law, not a rule of constitutional law.  
 6 See, for example, Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and 
the Law 37–41 (Princeton 1997); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 29 (Princeton 
1988) (describing adherents to the “protestant” theory of constitutional textualism); John 
F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 
113 Yale L J 1663, 1665 (2004); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—
Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv L Rev 26, 26–28 (2000). 
 7 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 1 (Har-
vard 1980); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan L Rev 
703, 710–11 (1975). 
 8 John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum L Rev 
70, 73 (2006); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 Stan L Rev 1, 1 (1984). 
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important strain in recent scholarship calls it the “big-C” ap-
proach because of the essential role that it reserves for the writ-
ten Constitution—the proper noun, with a capital “C.”9 
A rival idea, which we can call the “small-c” approach, 
draws on an older and more generic meaning of the noun “con-
stitution.”10 According to this approach, the “constitution” (with 
a lowercase “c”) is the web of documents, practices, institutions, 
norms, and traditions that structure American government.11 
Small-c theory is internally diverse, but it has a unifying theme: 
many constitutional rules are not grounded in the text of the 
big-C Constitution.12 Most small-c theorists agree that rules ap-
pearing in that document are constitutional rules, but they 
maintain that constitutionality can have other sources as well. 
To go back to the list of attributes of constitutional rules identi-
fied above, small-c theorists often hold that rules not appearing 
in the text are nevertheless constitutional because they are im-
portant to the structure of government or because they reflect 
fundamental American values.13 
It should be clear that the real dispute between big-C and 
small-c theorists is not about the meaning of a term. Reasonable 
people on both sides understand that a word can carry many 
meanings. Small-c constitutionalists understand that in the 
United States the word “Constitution” names the 1787 docu-
ment as amended, and big-C constitutionalists understand that 
there is an older sense of “constitution” that, as applied to the 
United States, describes something broader than that document. 
 
 9 See William N. Eskridge Jr and John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New 
American Constitution 25 (Yale 2010); Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 33 (cited in note 
6); Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional 
Commitment, 124 Harv L Rev 657, 700 (2011).  
 10 See Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 33 (cited in note 6); Walter Bagehot, The 
English Constitution 4–6 (Chapman and Hall 1867); Aristotle, Constitution of Athens 
and Related Texts 83, 113–16 (Hafner 1950) (Kurt Von Fritz and Ernst Kapp, trans); 
Levinson, 124 Harv L Rev at 700 (cited in note 9). 
 11 See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and 
Principles We Live By ix–xvi (2012); Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 1–
2 (cited in note 9); Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 33–37 (cited in note 6); Christopher 
G. Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution of the United States: A Philosophical Inquiry 
into the Fundamentals of American Constitutional Law 16 (Putnam 1890); Ernest A. 
Young, The Constitution outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L J 408, 414 (2007). 
 12 See, for example, David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 34–35 (Oxford 2010); 
Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional 
Meaning 1–9 (Harvard 1999); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitu-
tion 93–94 (Oxford 1982).  
 13 See note 12. 
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What is in dispute is the relationship of the constitution (with a 
small “c”) and the Constitution (with a big “C”) to authoritative 
constitutionality in American law. After all, theorists of the dif-
ferent schools do not contend with each other only about how to 
apply the label. They generally argue in order to establish that 
some disputed rule is or is not entitled to be treated as supreme 
law, or as entrenched against revision, or as enforceable through 
judicial review. We argue about the basis for constitutionality in 
part in order to establish which rules are entitled to those privi-
leged payoffs. 
The structure of that argument points to something that 
most small-c theory shares with the big-C approach. On both 
sides of the divide, constitutionality is understood as a status 
that rules do or do not enjoy in light of some qualifying criteria. 
A known set of payoffs is then supposed to follow from constitu-
tional status. Different small-c theories have different accounts 
of the qualifying criteria and of the payoffs, and not every payoff 
of constitutionality is claimed for every rule labeled “constitu-
tional.” But as a general matter, big-C and small-c theory alike 
proceed by grouping the various attributes of constitutionality 
together, identifying some as bases for constitutional status and 
others as its consequences. 
My contention in this Article is that it is misleading to think 
of constitutionality as a status with bases and payoffs. Instead, 
we should think of it in the way that an earlier generation of 
theorists learned to understand property: as a bundle of sticks 
that can be separated from one another or that can be recom-
bined in varying configurations.14 Some rules that are stated in 
the text of the Constitution are supreme over other rules, and 
some are not. Some rules that are enforceable through judicial 
review are in the text, and some are not. Some rules arising 
from structure are entrenched against revision, and some are 
not. And so on. No single attribute of constitutionality character-
izes every rule that mainstream American practice calls “consti-
tutional.” Instead, constitutional rules exhibit a mix-and-match 
variety of characteristics, none of which is fully definitive of the 
status. 
The point should be pushed a step further. Just as no single 
attribute is essential for constitutional status, no attribute 
 
 14 See, for example, Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 Harv L 
Rev 1691, 1691 (2012) (describing the bundle-of-sticks conception). 
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associated with constitutionality—trivial exceptions aside—is 
either necessary or sufficient for a rule’s exhibiting any other 
characteristic of constitutional rules. A rule stated in the text 
might or might not operate as supreme law, might or might not 
be fundamental to the structure of government, and might or 
might not be enforceable through judicial review. A rule derived 
from the structure of government might or might not be enforce-
able through judicial review, might or might not require Article 
V amendment to be changed, and might or might not operate as 
supreme law. And so on. As a result, it is misleading to arrange 
the attributes of constitutionality into a set of bases and a set of 
payoffs, because—subject to minor exceptions—no characteristic 
of constitutionality necessarily follows from any other. 
This claim is a form of small-c constitutionalism, but it 
pushes farther than most small-c theory has gone. The essential 
move of small-c theory is to decouple one of the attributes of con-
stitutional status, namely textuality, from constitutionality it-
self.15 That move is a partial unbundling of constitutionality. But 
small-c theory generally does not take the project of unbundling 
as far as it would helpfully go. For one thing, some small-c theo-
ry shares the big-C impulse to define essential qualifying attrib-
utes of constitutional status—not textuality, but something 
else.16 For another, small-c theory commonly assumes that a 
particular set of payoffs (often including judicial review) follows 
from constitutional status, if only constitutionality is understood 
in the right way.17 My point here, however, is that each of these 
attributes is also severable from the constitutional bundle, much 
as textuality is. Just as it is a mistake to think of constitutional-
ity as the bundle of characteristics that big-C theory presents, it 
is generally a mistake to think of it as some other bundle of 
characteristics that automatically travel together. 
The approach I offer might seem to make constitutional de-
cisionmaking dangerously indeterminate. Just as conceiving of 
property as a bundle of sticks can make it more difficult to say 
who “owns” Blackacre,18 understanding constitutionality as a 
 
 15 See, for example, David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 
63 U Chi L Rev 877, 883 (1996) (“It is the rare constitutional case in which the text plays 
any significant role.”). See also Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 54–89 (cited in note 6); 
Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution at 155 (cited in note 11). 
 16 See, for example, K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 Colum L 
Rev 1, 22 (1934) (describing “highly probable permanence” as the “one essential criterion”). 
 17 See Part II.B. 
 18 See Smith, 125 Harv L Rev at 1691–92 (cited in note 14). 
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bundle of sticks can make it more problematic to say that a giv-
en rule is, or is not, constitutional. Suppose that American law 
does feature (1) rules fundamental to the structure of govern-
ment but not enforceable by judicial review, (2) rules enforced by 
judicial review but not stated in the text, (3) rules stated in the 
text that do not operate as supreme law, and (4) rules that oper-
ate as supreme law but can be changed without formal amend-
ment. Which of these are constitutional rules? On the common 
premise that the distinction between constitutional and noncon-
stitutional rules tells decisionmakers which rules to treat as su-
preme, entrenched, and eligible for judicial review, there needs 
to be a way to answer this question. How, after all, can a judge 
exercise the power of judicial review unless he knows which 
rules are constitutional? And how can he know which rules 
are constitutional without an account of what qualifies as 
constitutionality? 
There is something sensible to this worry. Judicial review 
should not be exercised cavalierly or idiosyncratically. Hence the 
venerable tradition of trying to discipline its exercise with objec-
tive criteria, textual or otherwise.19 But sorting carefully 
through the idea of unbundled constitutionality should reveal 
that the indeterminacy it creates is less of a practical problem 
than might be feared. Yes, disaggregating constitutionality into 
separate components might make it more difficult, or just less 
meaningful, to distinguish between rules that are constitutional 
and those that are not. But it also strips the distinction of its 
power to decide which rules may be judicially enforced. The line 
is no longer as well marked, but it is also less consequential. We 
cannot easily say what is constitutional and what is not, and, 
fortunately, little depends on our ability to do so. 
What decisionmakers still must decide, though, is whether 
to treat particular rules as supreme, entrenched, and eligible for 
judicial review. The unbundled model indicates that they cannot 
answer those questions just by determining whether the rules in 
question are textual, structural, fundamental to American val-
ues, or the like. They will need to make some further sub-
stantive judgments, which is exactly what many theories of 
 
 19 See, for example, Strauss, The Living Constitution at 33–34 (cited in note 12); 
Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate at 29–37 (cited in note 12) (describing Justice Black’s textu-
alism as a response to a crisis precipitated by realist theories of judging); Ely, Democracy 
and Distrust at 43–69 (cited in note 7). 
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constitutionality and of judicial review strive to avoid. That said, 
two points of potential comfort are worth highlighting. 
First, despite the long, important, and understandable tra-
dition of worrying about undisciplined judicial review, occasions 
requiring major exercises of subjective judgment on such ques-
tions are rare. Relatively few cases actually require judges to 
make new decisions about whether a given rule is properly en-
forced through judicial review. At this stage in the development 
of American law, most cases that come before courts are gov-
erned on this point by precedent, and that precedent is generally 
followed.20 To be sure, some cases are not governed by precedent, 
and even cases that are so governed reflect the prior exercise of 
judgment, usually by some other court. But if the fear is that 
judges will be left at sea, it might help to realize that most of the 
time the waters are pretty well charted already. 
Second, on those occasions when precedent is not clearly 
dispositive, no plausible theory of judicial review succeeds in 
eliminating the need for exercises of judgment. That being the 
case, it may be better to have an accurate understanding of the 
judicial task, even if that understanding leaves important ques-
tions open, rather than to rest on a theory that answers more 
questions but does so less accurately.21 To be sure, a sound theo-
ry that answered more questions about when and why judges 
should exercise judicial review would be more valuable than a 
 
 20 See Richard Primus, Limits of Interpretivism, 32 Harv J L & Pub Pol 159, 164–
67, 172 (2009); Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 883 (cited in note 15). 
 21 It is worth acknowledging the possibility that understanding a practice accurate-
ly is not always the practitioner’s highest good. Perhaps a swimmer or a saxophonist 
might perform better without a precise understanding of all of her necessary physical 
movements, because operating with the precise understanding might cause her to focus 
on and worry about things that she would otherwise have done properly without con-
scious attention. Or perhaps the driver of a car will drive more safely with a slightly fal-
sified understanding of his vehicle than if he truly understands everything the car can 
do. (I do not mean to take any position with respect to these specific examples; I mean 
only to suggest the nature of the concern.) If judging is such a practice, one might won-
der whether American law would be better off if judges stuck to the idea that judicial 
review calls for them just to make their best assessments of formal authorities like con-
stitutional text, rather than requiring them to consider in a more substantive way 
whether some rule should be judicially enforced. After all, the thought would run, the 
judges have been doing a reasonably good job up until now, even if they are operating 
with a slight misunderstanding of their activity; a more accurate understanding might 
either unnerve them (thus impeding their function) or liberate them (thus opening the 
door to mischief). I suppose that’s possible. As a piece of scholarship, though, the func-
tion of this Article is to present a picture accurately, and perhaps thereby to do more 
good than harm, rather than to proceed on the assumption that clear-sighted under-
standing is on balance a dangerous thing.  
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theory answering fewer of those questions. But it is not my am-
bition in this Article to develop a thorough and actionable justi-
fication for judicial review. Instead, I hope to lay bare some fea-
tures of current practice that such a theory of judicial review 
should take into account. If the reality of constitutional practice 
is that the putative payoffs of constitutionality are not really 
driven by a set of formal criteria, we would improve our under-
standing by recognizing the fact. 
One more framing assumption is worth specifying here. My 
claim—that the attributes of constitutionality behave more like 
sticks in a bundle than like a set of necessary bases and the 
payoffs that follow—is a claim about the existing practice of con-
stitutional law in the United States. Each time I adduce evi-
dence, as for example by pointing out that a given rule is treated 
as supreme or as enforceable through judicial review, I mean to 
report a feature of the practice as it exists. I do not offer deep 
justifications for these practices, and constitutional law as a 
whole might be improved by altering some of the practices I re-
port. Perhaps some rule that is now treated as judicially en-
forceable should not be; perhaps some rule that is treated as 
changeable through ordinary legislation should be considered 
entrenched until overcome by some higher threshold for change. 
We have no reason, after all, to think that existing practice is 
perfect. That said, I presume throughout this Article that the ex-
isting practice of constitutional law in the United States is also 
not radically deficient. On that presumption, I investigate the 
system as it actually functions. 
Not everyone shares that presumption. Some theorists see 
prevailing practice as a serious perversion of the constitutional 
system properly understood, such that the best course of action 
would be radical reform.22 If so, one such reform might be the 
bundling of constitutional attributes that I claim are best under-
stood as separable sticks. In other words, some readers will be 
inclined to say that, if there are in fact a bunch of rules that are 
enforced through judicial review but not in the text or in the text 
but not treated as supreme law, that fact is regrettable, if not il-
legitimate. The appropriate response to our present reality, the 
argument might run, is not to build a constitutional theory on 
this unhappy mess but to insist on a more orderly system in 
 
 22 See, for example, Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Pre-
sumption of Liberty 354–57 (Princeton 2004); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the 
Commerce Power, 73 Va L Rev 1387, 1387–88 (1987). 
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which constitutionality has a clear set of bases and a clear set of 
payoffs, whether on the textual model or on one of the small-c 
alternatives. 
My own suspicion, for what it is worth, is that this objection 
is both too pessimistic about the system that now operates and 
too optimistic about a preferred alternative. But I do not mean 
to pursue this line of disagreement to any great depth. For pre-
sent purposes, suffice it to say that the analysis presented here 
is a characterization of American constitutional practice as we 
know it. That practice is imperfect, but it is not a failure. Under-
standing how it operates is at least as worthwhile an endeavor 
as speculating about some other system that seems unlikely to 
replace it. 
In Part I of this Article, I illustrate the idea of constitution-
ality as a bundle of sticks by reference to what I have called the 
big-C approach. In Part II, I apply the same analysis to what I 
have called small-c approaches. Those approaches admit of 
greater complexity than the big-C approach, because they are 
not rooted in the simplifying idea that constitutional rules all 
share a single basis. But many small-c accounts still imagine 
constitutionality as a bundled status, with a broader set of bases 
driving a known set of payoffs. 
The reality, I argue, is more complex still. The attributes of 
constitutionality combine in many different configurations, such 
that it is generally unwise to draw conclusions about a rule’s 
status with respect to some of those attributes by reference to its 
status with respect to others. Accordingly, officials who must de-
cide whether a given rule should be treated as supreme or en-
trenched or enforceable through judicial review should not frame 
their inquiry in terms of whether that rule is constitutional. Af-
ter all, establishing the constitutionality of a rule will not an-
swer the question that the decisionmaker must resolve, because 
no set of consequences reliably follows from a rule’s being consti-
tutional. To settle the actionable question, a decisionmaker must 
know something more. He must push beyond constitutionality. 
I.  THE BIG-C BUNDLE 
A. Four Sticks 
A simple form of the big-C vision can be understood as imag-
ining constitutionality as a status with four elements. The first 
element is textuality. On this vision, constitutional rules are 
 2013] Unbundling Constitutionality 1089 
 
those—and only those—that are stated in the text of the written 
document we call the Constitution. The second element is su-
premacy. Constitutional rules are superior to other legal rules, 
such that a collision between a constitutional rule and any other 
legal rule must be resolved in favor of the constitutional rule. 
The third element is supermajoritarian entrenchment. Constitu-
tional rules can be changed only through the process described 
in Article V; any nonconstitutional legal rule can be changed by 
ordinary legislation. Finally, the fourth element is eligibility for 
enforcement through judicial review. Courts have the authority 
to enforce constitutional rules—but only constitutional rules—
when doing so requires nullifying enacted legislation.23 
Two nods to nuance are here in order. First, textuality need 
not mean wooden literalism.24 Consider the distinction between 
the “hard textualism” that insists upon reading every word of 
applicable constitutional text closely and the “soft textualism” 
that accepts “reasonable” though nonliteral readings of constitu-
tional text.25 A rule that is textual on either approach can be suf-
ficiently textual to be big-C constitutional, so long as the text is 
the genuine source of the rule. Second, few sophisticated consti-
tutional practitioners insist that this big-C picture fully and ac-
curately captures American constitutionalism, either descrip-
tively or normatively. Outside of confirmation hearings, many 
people freely recognize the nontextual bases of some constitu-
tional rules, and even those generally inclined toward textual-
ism usually acknowledge that a certain amount of nontextual 
constitutional law exists in practice.26 (For some, of course, that 
statement is made as a criticism of the practice that exists.)27 
 
 23 It is tempting to recharacterize these four propositions as one unified idea: that 
the text of the written Constitution and only the text of the written Constitution is the 
supreme law. Article V is part of the written Constitution, so the element of entrench-
ment might follow from the fact of textual supremacy. And though many have contested 
the point, many others read Article III to authorize judicial review. On that reading, all 
four elements of the big-C approach are present in the statement that the written Con-
stitution is the supreme law. This articulation of the big-C idea as one unified whole pre-
sents that approach in what this Article would call its most fully bundled form.  
 24 See, for example, Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 Va L Rev 347, 348 
(2005) (“[N]o ‘textualist’ favors isolating [ ] language from its surrounding context.”). 
 25 Richard Primus, Constitutional Expectations, 109 Mich L Rev 91, 97–98 (2010). 
 26 See, for example, Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 129, 139–40 (cited in note 
6) (describing the role of stare decisis). 
 27 See Martin H. Redish and Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional 
Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alterna-
tive, 64 Fla L Rev 1485, 1512 (2012) (describing nontextualism as a threat to “constitu-
tional democracy”). 
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With those qualifications understood, I want to call atten-
tion to three features of the picture I have sketched. First, the 
big-C vision shapes a good deal of thinking about constitutional 
law, even if most sophisticated practitioners regard it as incom-
plete. Most well-educated Americans who are not constitutional 
lawyers would probably supply something like this picture if 
asked to explain the role of constitutional law in American gov-
ernment. Certainly a great many law students enter their stud-
ies with something like this picture in mind, and many of them 
strive admirably to keep faith with that picture as they learn 
more and more about constitutional law. Even among theorists 
and practitioners who would say that some constitutional law 
lacks a textual basis, the big-C vision may supply a picture of 
constitutional law’s normal case. Yes, the thought would run, 
there are instances in which other things are going on. But those 
instances are exceptions rather than the standard mode. 
Second, the big-C vision I have sketched understands the 
four elements of constitutionality to travel together as a single 
bundle. A rule stated in the text is supreme and is entrenched 
and is eligible for judicial enforcement. A rule that cannot be 
changed except by amendment is supreme and is eligible for ju-
dicial enforcement and is grounded in the text. And so on. 
Third, textuality is the basis of constitutional status, and 
the other three elements are payoffs. To be sure, identifying any 
one of the four elements as a property of a given rule establishes 
the rule’s constitutional status. Only constitutional rules have 
these properties, so the presence of any of the four elements es-
tablishes constitutionality, which also means that it establishes 
the presence of the other three elements. But the fact that one 
can establish a rule’s constitutionality by demonstrating any one 
of the four elements is evidentiary. As a justificatory matter, a 
rule is constitutional because it is written in the text. The other 
three elements are the payoffs that follow. Thus, the fact that a 
rule is enforced through judicial review indicates its constitu-
tionality, and what that implicitly means is that the exercise of 
(legitimate) judicial review indicates that there is a textual justi-
fication for the rule. 
This vision of constitutionality as a status with one basis 
(text) and three consistent payoffs (supremacy, entrenchment, 
judicial reviewability) has some considerable virtues. It is sim-
ple. It seems to capture well a canonical set of the virtues of 
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written constitutionalism.28 It resonates with the widely held vi-
sion of the written Constitution as the authoritative basis of 
American government.29 It teaches that government officials are 
subject to a set of rules that they cannot alter by their own de-
cree. And to the extent that it is internalized, it plays an im-
portant role in both enabling and constraining the practice of ju-
dicial review.30 By presenting judicial review as the enforcement 
of a specified set of legitimately formulated rules, this big-C vi-
sion offers a clear and apparently mostly palatable explanation 
for why the work of elected officials must sometimes be set 
aside. At the same time, it cautions the judges against adventur-
ism by telling them that their authority is limited by the content 
of those rules. To be sure, many judges understand that the ju-
diciary can and does strike down laws that do not contravene 
any text in the written Constitution. But even so, the fact that 
the prevailing explanation for the legitimacy of judicial review 
requires appeal to an objective authority may help discourage 
judges from thinking of their own considered views as sufficient 
bases for declaring laws invalid.31 
 
 28 See, for example, Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803) (ar-
ticulating virtues of a written Constitution). 
 29 A community can be mistaken about its own practices. But other things being 
equal, it is a virtue for a theory of a social practice to be consistent with the self-
understandings of the participants in that practice. See Clifford Geertz, The Interpreta-
tion of Cultures 14–15 (Basic Books 1973). 
 30 To be sure, one might count enabling judicial review as a liability: more than one 
important theorist has suggested that we would be better off without judicial review. 
See, for example, Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case against Judicial Review, 115 
Yale L J 1346, 1353 (2006). But without taking the time necessary to argue the point all 
the way through, I will proceed on the premise that judicial review is, on balance, a net 
good within the system of American government. This is by no means to say that judicial 
review as it currently exists in the United States is the optimal form of judicial review. It 
is only to say, with full knowledge that the proposition would be very difficult to prove, 
that we are on balance better off with this institution as it exists than we would be if it 
did not exist at all. 
 31 The prevalence of the big-C idea executes these functions whether or not the 
substance of the idea accurately describes the operation of American constitutional law. 
The relevant effects on the attitudes and behaviors of judges and other officials—to 
whatever extent those effects materialize—follow from the fact that people articulate or 
subscribe to the big-C idea. In other words, the big-C idea need not be offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted. The assertion itself does a good deal of work, much of it de-
sirable. To be sure, people who take the big-C idea seriously might balk at having it de-
picted as a helpful fable rather than a working theory of government, and at the extreme 
limit it is possible that the salutary effects of asserting the big-C picture would unravel if 
too many people came to think of it as a fable alone. But at present, no such danger 
seems to present itself. The big-C idea is alive and well. 
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My project here, however, is to demonstrate a key respect in 
which the big-C vision thoroughly misdescribes the operative re-
alities of American government. In practice, the different ele-
ments of constitutionality that big-C theory bundles together of-
ten travel separately. Many propositions that courts 
uncontroversially enforce through the power of judicial review 
are not derived from the Constitution’s text. The text of the Con-
stitution contains propositions that do not function as supreme 
law, despite never having been superseded by formal amend-
ment. And many rules that have been treated as supreme law at 
some point in time have been changed by mechanisms other 
than the one that Article V deems necessary to overcome consti-
tutional entrenchment. 
I am not the first person to make most of the preceding 
claims.32 As noted above, few sophisticated American lawyers in-
sist on big-C theory in its most inflexible form. And to the extent 
that practitioners and theorists of constitutional law recognize 
that the big-C picture is an oversimplification, a demonstration 
that constitutional practice departs from that picture will not be 
useful news. The aim of the analysis that follows, however, is 
not simply to show that the big-C conception is not a complete 
picture of mainstream constitutional practice. It is to show that 
the idea of constitutionality as a status with one basis (text) and 
three payoffs (supremacy, formal entrenchment, and judicial re-
view) fails even as a rough approximation. Considered dispas-
sionately, the big-C account is no more plausible as a description 
of constitutional practice—and perhaps considerably less plausi-
ble—than an account in which constitutional law is dominated 
by rules whose bases lie outside the text. 
Perhaps the best way to unbundle the big-C picture of con-
stitutionality is to give examples of well-accepted rules that 
have some but not others of the four properties that the big-C 
picture bundles together. So consider Figure 1, located at page 
1105. This four-by-four grid has sixteen boxes representing all 
the ways in which a rule might have one of the elements in the 
 
 32 See, for example, Strauss, The Living Constitution at 115–17 (cited in note 12); 
Charles L. Black Jr, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law 11, 29–32 (LSU 
1969) (arguing for nontextual sources of constitutional law); Tiedeman, The Unwritten 
Constitution at 155 (cited in note 11); Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 
Harv L Rev 1737, 1741–43 (2007) (describing processes of constitutional change other 
than Article V); Grey, 27 Stan L Rev at 706–10 (cited in note 7) (arguing for nontextual 
sources of constitutional law); Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 3–4 (cited in note 16). 
 2013] Unbundling Constitutionality 1093 
 
big-C bundle but lack one of the other elements, and the boxes 
are populated with examples. 
For Figure 1 and other parts of the present claim to be per-
suasive, though, my argument must overcome an obstacle re-
garding the selection of rules that are to count as examples. 
Suppose that in the course of arguing that nontextual rules are 
pervasive in constitutional law, I offer rules about commandeer-
ing, state sovereign immunity, and abortion as examples of non-
textual constitutional rules. Someone who wanted to resist my 
perspective—that is, someone who wanted to argue that nontex-
tual rules are rare or nonexistent within constitutional law—
might contest the legitimacy of those examples in either of two 
ways. First, he might pronounce some or all of those rules inva-
lid and thus not really admissible as evidence of constitutional 
law properly understood. This possibility arises from the persis-
tent fact that many (putative) constitutional rules are of con-
tested validity. To the extent that we cannot agree on what rules 
count as the rules of constitutional law, it will be hard to con-
vince each other of claims about the set of constitutional rules. 
Second, even if a critic of my argument agreed that the rules 
about commandeering or abortion or state sovereign immunity 
are valid examples of constitutional rules, he might dispute my 
characterization of those rules as nontextual. People see differ-
ent things in the same texts, after all. If we cannot agree about 
whether a given rule is present in the text, we will be less able 
to convince each other that textuality is, or is not, a necessary 
(or nearly necessary) property of constitutional rules. 
I doubt that these obstacles can be overcome to the satisfac-
tion of every reader. To be fully persuasive, my argument would 
need to make use of a set of examples that everyone agrees are 
examples of valid constitutional rules, and it would also require 
broad agreement about whether each rule discussed was in fact 
textual, supreme, formally entrenched, and subject to judicial 
review. The community of constitutional practitioners is too di-
verse in its views for full consensus to be feasible on these 
points. It may be possible, however, to offer an analysis that 
rests on enough common ground to persuade many and perhaps 
most readers that the four sticks in the big-C bundle can be 
pulled apart. To that end, I adhere to two methodological princi-
ples. 
First, to the greatest extent possible, I will discuss only 
rules whose validity is broadly accepted within the world of 
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constitutional practice. That does not mean that I will avoid dis-
cussing rules with which some people disagree. Someone doubts 
the validity of just about every rule, including the rule authoriz-
ing the existence of the Federal Reserve Bank33 and the rule for-
bidding the racial segregation of a state’s public schools.34 It 
means, rather, that I will limit myself to rules that are relied on 
as a matter of course in the practice of constitutional law, and 
will avoid rules whose validity is the subject of significant ongo-
ing contest. If I confine my analysis to rules of that kind, then 
critics who would respond by denying that the rules I adduce are 
valid illustrations of American constitutional law will be in the 
position of offering a radical critique of the practice, rather than 
of contesting my description of the practice as it exists. 
Second, I will articulate criteria for classifying rules as tex-
tual, supreme, formally entrenched, or judicially reviewable. 
Some of these characterizations are slippery because they turn 
on matters of contested judgment. Sometimes we differ in our 
assessment of phenomena we observe: different people read 
texts differently, so a rule that seems textual to one person 
might seem nontextual to someone else. In other instances, clear 
right answers about whether rules exhibit these characteristics 
are elusive because they rest on predictions about the conduct of 
actors in the system. To say that a rule is entrenched by the 
terms of Article V, for example, it is not for present purposes 
sufficient to point out that the rule is a constitutional rule and 
that the Constitution can only be amended through Article V. To 
make the case that way would simply be to report the big-C the-
ory, rather than to demonstrate something about how American 
constitutional practices actually operate. To show that a rule is 
Article V entrenched as an operative matter, one would have to 
show that changing the rule would in practice require an Article 
V amendment. As I describe more thoroughly below, that might 
be a hard demonstration to make.35 
 
 33 See Ron Paul, End the Fed 18–31 (Grand Central 2009) (arguing that the Feder-
al Reserve is unconstitutional). But see McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 
324–26 (1819) (upholding Congress’s creation of the Bank of the United States). 
 34 See Adrian Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Le-
gal Interpretation 280 (Harvard 2006) (arguing that Brown was wrongly decided). 
 35 Articulating these methods should clarify what the classifications mean as used 
here. To be sure, no reader is compelled to accept the choices these methods reflect. That 
said, these explanations should sharpen the idea of unbundled constitutionality that is 
offered in this Article because they will help elucidate a view of the relationships among 
these features of constitutional rules. And if the slipperiness and uncertainty involved in 
these classifications make it hard to establish that each example offered really does 
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Here, then, are explanations of what it means, for purposes 
of the present analysis, to say that as a matter of operative prac-
tice a rule is or is not textual, or supreme, or Article V en-
trenched, or judicially reviewable. The discussions of supremacy 
and judicial review are relatively brief; those of textuality and 
entrenchment require more complexity. 
1. Textuality. 
Any claim that a given rule is or is not stated in the Consti-
tution’s text must reckon with the fact that different people un-
derstand that text to carry different meanings. In many cases, 
whether the text embodies a particular rule is a matter of legit-
imate controversy. But the lesson here is not that differentiating 
between textual and nontextual rules is a hopeless enterprise. It 
is that one should be prepared to see nuance in the subject mat-
ter when approaching the categorization. 
One good step in that direction is to understand textuality 
as a dimensional category rather than a binary one. Rules may 
be more and less grounded in the text rather than being fully 
textual or fully not. With that perspective in mind, the set of 
rules that properly socialized practitioners of American law 
would uncontroversially identify as constitutional rules can be 
imagined to lie along a continuum of textuality, and that contin-
uum can be illustrated as follows: 
(1) The rule is plainly stated in the text. (Example: Every 
state gets two senators.)36 
 
(2) The rule is fairly implied by the text. (Example: Con-
gress can create an Air Force.)37 
 
(3) The rule is not stated in the text, but it is associated 
with a particular clause, and we have an official story ex-
plaining why that clause justifies the rule despite its 
 
demonstrate a certain combination of constitutional characteristics, the exercise of work-
ing through the examples should still make the fully bundled big-C picture hard to main-
tain simply by highlighting how hard it is to say with confidence that a particular rule is 
textual, supreme, formally entrenched, and judicially reviewable. The picture of big-C 
bundling requires one to be able to make that judgment cleanly about every constitu-
tional rule. 
 36 US Const Amend XVII. 
 37 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 12 (authorizing Congress to “raise and support Armies”). 
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wording. (Example: The state of Michigan may not abridge 
the freedom of speech.)38 
 
(4) The rule is not stated in the text, but it is associated 
with a particular clause, and we have an official story ex-
plaining why that clause entails the proposition despite its 
wording, and the official story strains plausibility, but we go 
with it anyway. (Example: Congress may not segregate pub-
lic schools.)39 
 
(5) The rule is not stated in the text, but it is associated 
with a particular clause, and we have no story at all ex-
plaining why the clause entails the proposition despite its 
wording, but we seem not to mind or even to notice. (Exam-
ple: The president may not abridge the freedom of speech.)40 
 
(6) The proposition is not stated in the text, but it is associ-
ated with a particular clause, and we acknowledge that the 
wording of the clause does not entail the proposition. (Ex-
ample: Congress may not commandeer state executive 
officials.)41 
 
 38 See, for example, Locke v Davey, 540 US 712, 718 (2004) (treating the substan-
tive provisions of the First Amendment as incorporated against the states through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth). 
 39 See Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 498–99 (1954). See also Richard A. Primus, 
Bolling Alone, 104 Colum L Rev 975, 976 (2004) (explaining and criticizing the idea that 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is incorporated against the 
federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
 40 See, for example, Federal Communications Commission v Fox Television Sta-
tions, Inc, 132 S Ct 2307, 2312 (2012). The idea that the First Amendment runs against 
the executive branch is not controversial. But the text of the First Amendment is ad-
dressed to “Congress.” Many words in the Constitution are subject to multiple interpre-
tations, but if pressed to identify something that the word “Congress” in the Constitution 
should not be read to mean, “President” seems like a safe choice. Unlike the extension of 
First Amendment norms to cover states, which is officially explained by the doctrine of 
incorporation, no official story exists to explain why a text written as a limitation on the 
power of Congress also works a limitation on the power of a different branch of the fed-
eral government. Much the same could be said of the idea that the guarantees of the 
First Amendment run against the federal courts. See, for example, Bernard v Gulf Oil 
Co, 619 F2d 459, 466–67 (5th Cir 1980) (invalidating the district court’s gag order as a 
violation of the First Amendment’s guarantee of the freedom of speech). The judiciary, 
like the president, is not the Congress.  
 41 See Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 905 (1997) (“Because there is no consti-
tutional text speaking to this precise question, the answer to the CLEOs’ challenge must 
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(7) The proposition is not even associated with any particu-
lar clause in the text. (Example: No state may unilaterally 
secede from the Union.)42 
The degrees of textuality that I have here assigned to these con-
stitutional rules are the ones that seem to me most plausible as 
a reader of the Constitution. Other people will likely argue for 
somewhat different classifications. Because people are drawn to 
varying interpretations of texts, reasonable people can disagree 
about where along the continuum a given proposition falls. For 
example, I have identified the proposition that Congress may 
not segregate public schools as one that is associated with a 
clause in the Constitution by virtue of a largely implausible offi-
cial story. That story, of course, is that the text of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment incorporates the content of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. My rea-
sons for skepticism about that story as an account of reading the 
text are conventional.43 Nonetheless, I recognize that other in-
terpreters might find that reading of the Fifth Amendment’s 
text more plausible than I do,44 in which case they might classify 
this proposition as closer to (3) above than to (4). I do not think, 
however, that any reasonable argument can present all seven of 
 
be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, 
and in the jurisprudence of this Court.”). Note, however, that constitutional discourse’s 
tendency to seek textual homes for doctrines, see note 45, has fostered subsequent re-
formulations of the anticommandeering principle under which the rule might be under-
stood to be an interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause. See, for example, Ilya 
Somin, A Mandate for Mandates: Is the Individual Health Insurance Case a Slippery 
Slope?, 75 L & Contemp Probs 75, 89 & n 64 (2012) (presenting the holding of Printz as 
an interpretation of the term “proper” in the Necessary and Proper Clause); Transcript of 
Oral Argument, Department of Health and Human Services v Florida, No 11-398, *26–27 
(US Mar 27, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 1017220) (Scalia) (characterizing 
the holdings of Printz and New York v United States as interpretations of the term 
“proper” in the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
 42 As the old joke has it, the legal authority for this constitutional proposition is the 
case of Lee v Grant. See, for example, Josh Chafetz, Book Review, Multiplicity in Feder-
alism and the Separation of Powers, 120 Yale L J 1084, 1097 n 74–75 (2011). 
 43 See, for example, Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 32 (cited in note 7) (describing 
the reverse incorporation doctrine as “gibberish”). See also Primus, 104 Colum L Rev at 
977 n 7 (cited in note 39) (collecting criticism of the doctrine). 
 44 See, for example, Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity 
and Theory, 47 Stan L Rev 395, 408–10 (1995) (arguing that Bolling correctly recognized 
that Reconstruction had changed the meaning of “Due Process”). 
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these constitutional rules as clearly stated in or even as fairly 
implied by the text itself.45 
In demonstrating that many nontextual rules are operative-
ly supreme, entrenched, or judicially enforceable, I will use only 
examples that seem to me to fall in categories (5), (6), and (7). 
That is so even though rules in category (4) and perhaps even 
category (3) are also probably best understood as rooted in some-
thing other than the text.46 By restricting myself to the yet more 
clearly nontextual rules in categories (5), (6), and (7), I hope to 
reduce the incidence of objections that proceed by contesting my 
characterization of rules as nontextual. And to the degree that I 
am right to regard rules in categories (3) and (4) as nontextual 
too, readers should infer that the degree to which textuality can 
be separated from supremacy, formal entrenchment, and judicial 
review is substantially greater than the set of examples offered 
here might suggest. 
 
 45 This statement is true as I write it. But it may be true only contingently, under 
the circumstances of 2013. A large part of the process of constitutional change is about 
shifting expectations that make it plausible to read a text differently at different times. 
Part of the job description of good constitutional lawyers is to find ways to move proposi-
tions down this continuum, taking norms that seem nontextual and finding ways to read 
the text so as to encompass them. Similarly, and precisely because of the background 
power of the big-C vision, the pressure of a concrete need for judicial action may prompt 
a court to create an official association between a proposition and a clause where there 
was none before. Above, I say that the proposition that no state may secede from the Un-
ion is not even associated with any particular clause in the Constitution. But a court that 
was actually called upon to review the constitutionality of a state statute announcing 
that state’s secession from the Union might well read any of a number of clauses to pro-
hibit the secession. After that date, the proposition that no state may secede would in 
fact be associated with a clause, so it would no longer be an example of my seventh cate-
gory. Which category the proposition would then represent would depend upon what ex-
planation the court gave of the link between the clause and the proposition, as well as 
whether the audience of constitutional lawyers—then and later—found the link plausi-
ble as a matter of reading the text. I cannot say, therefore, that the mapping I provide 
above will always seem sensible to conversant constitutional lawyers. But it is likely 
that, at any given time, the set of propositions that are uncontroversially regarded as 
constitutional will be arranged along this continuum. 
 46 My own view, for what it is worth, is that the text of the Constitution cannot rea-
sonably be read to direct either the rule that the State of Michigan may not abridge the 
freedom of speech or the rule that Congress may not segregate public schools by race, 
even on a “soft textualist” understanding of what the text might say. The better under-
standing of the relationship of these rules to the text is that the rule arises from sources 
outside the text and is then associated with a portion of the text that addresses some re-
lated subject. That process of association might be described as a species of textualism, 
but if so, it is not what the big-C conception means by textualism because the text is not 
operating as the basis of the rule’s constitutional status. See Primus, 32 Harv J L & Pub 
Pol at 167 (cited in note 20) (“If textualism has a core, it is the proposition that the text 
of the law has meaning and authority independent of what the judges have said and 
done.”). 
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2. Supremacy. 
In this analysis, the statement that a rule operates as su-
preme law means that either or both of the following two things 
is true: 
(1) Actions violating that rule are reliably nullified, pun-
ished, or redressed by some institutional authority whose 
actions in this regard are not subject to override by some 
other institutional decisionmaker.47 
 
(2) Nobody with the capacity to violate the rule attempts to 
do so, even when it would be in their interests, because all 
such actors regard themselves as being under the authority 
of a rule. 
Rules that are regularly enforced by courts exercising the 
power of judicial review exemplify the first condition. If the gov-
ernment tried to censor this Article because it disagreed with 
the views expressed here, any court in the land would issue an 
injunction against the censorship. A good example of a rule that 
is (or was) supreme on the strength of the second condition was 
the rule, prior to 1940, that presidents should retire after serv-
ing two terms. Between George Washington and Franklin Roo-
sevelt, presidents seem to have considered themselves obligated 
to step aside at the end of their second terms, and informed ana-
lysts accordingly described the two-term limit as a rule of consti-
tutional law.48 
As the preceding example demonstrates, a determined con-
stitutional entrepreneur can sometimes overcome or eliminate a 
rule of supreme law by declining to recognize its authority and 
getting away with it. If someone denies the authority of a rule 
that previous people in the same position felt themselves gov-
erned by, and if no other actor steps in to enforce the rule, the 
rule is no longer supreme because neither of the two conditions 
any longer obtains. President Roosevelt’s successful breach of 
the norm indicated that the rule did not in fact operate as 
 
 47 By an “institutional decisionmaker,” I mean a court, a legislature, or some other 
form of regularly operating body. I mean to exclude episodic decisionmaking processes 
like those involved in adopting formal constitutional amendments. 
 48 See, for example, William Bennett Munro, The Makers of the Unwritten Constitu-
tion 17–18 (Macmillan 1930); Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution at 51–53 (cited in 
note 11); Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 14 (cited in note 16). 
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supreme law. Note, however, that President Roosevelt’s innova-
tion demonstrated only that the two-term limit did not function 
as supreme law in 1940, when Roosevelt ran for his third term. 
The fact that the limit was not supreme law in 1940 does not tell 
us whether it operated as supreme law in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Whether the norm operated as su-
preme law at those times depends on the operative practices of 
those times, and it does seem that people treated the two-term 
limit as supreme law before President Roosevelt challenged the 
norm. 
Note that these two conditions for a rule’s operating as su-
preme law are independent of each other. Sometimes both exist 
at the same time: any court would block governmental censor-
ship of this Article, but nobody expects such judicial intervention 
to be necessary, because government officials generally recog-
nize that trying to censor speech would be a violation of authori-
tative rules and do not try to exercise censorial powers even 
when they dearly wish that some form of unwelcome speech 
would go away. That said, either of the two conditions can exist 
without the other, and either one is sufficient to demonstrate 
that a rule is operating as supreme law. 
3. Article V entrenchment. 
Article V provides that the Constitution can only be changed 
by a formal supermajoritarian process requiring action by Con-
gress and ratification by three-fourths of the states.49 Most prac-
titioners recognize, however, that the operative rules of constitu-
tional law can also be changed by other mechanisms, 
prominently including a majority vote of the Supreme Court. 
Several theorists have persuasively argued that most change to 
American constitutional law over the course of the last two hun-
dred years has come without Article V amendments.50 In prac-
tice, therefore, many rules that the bundled big-C vision imagi-
nes as Article V entrenched have turned out not to be so.51 To be 
sure, one might contend that constitutional change without Ar-
ticle V amendment is illegitimate or, more softly, that it works 
 
 49 US Const Art V. 
 50 See, for example, Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations 44–57 (Belknap 
1991); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv L Rev 
1457, 1457–59 (2001); Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 21–23 (cited in note 16). 
 51 One could also characterize President Roosevelt’s running for and winning a 
third term as a change to a constitutional rule through a mechanism other than Article V.  
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changes only in “constitutional doctrine” or “constitutional law,” 
each conceived as something different from the Constitution it-
self.52 For the reasons previously explained, however, I will move 
past these scruples. As always in this Article, the focus is on how 
the constitutional system actually functions.53 
To decide that a rule is Article V entrenched in practice, one 
would have to conclude that there is no process less demanding 
than Article V amendment that could change the rule. That is a 
difficult judgment to render in advance about most constitution-
al rules, especially if one internalizes deeply the point that far-
reaching constitutional change has in fact occurred without Ar-
ticle V amendment, including change that people situated ex 
ante might have thought could never occur without such 
amendments. Prior to the twentieth century, well-socialized 
American lawyers might have thought that, unless the Constitu-
tion were amended, constitutional law could not possibly author-
ize Congress to enact pervasive economic regulations, to dele-
gate broad power to administrative agencies, or to prohibit 
racial discrimination in privately owned businesses. All those 
things turned out to be possible without amendments. The 
Eighteenth Amendment testifies eloquently to one age’s convic-
tion that Article V was the means for accomplishing what an-
other age could accomplish by federal statute, were it inclined to 
do so. In the twenty-first century, when the Controlled Sub-
stances Act is valid Commerce Clause legislation,54 there is little 
reason to doubt that a federal statute banning the sale of alcohol 
would be similarly upheld. 
Perhaps it is unwise, therefore, to conclude that any rule is 
Article V entrenched for all time. If enough members of the deci-
sionmaking class come to view an issue differently in the future 
from the way it is understood now, constitutional change might 
be accomplished by other means. When prevailing opinion 
moves far enough to ratify an Article V amendment, the same 
climate of opinion tends to foster changed intuitions about how 
to read the existing constitutional text. By the time amendment 
 
 52 See, for example, Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 30–37 (cited in note 6) (de-
scribing this view). 
 53 Within that framework, the idea of a metaphysically correct constitutional rule 
that differs from operative doctrine is in one respect consequential: sometimes that idea 
motivates practitioners, some of whom might be judges, to work a change in the opera-
tive law.  
 54 See Gonzales v Raich, 545 US 1, 22 (2005). 
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is feasible, therefore, it may no longer be necessary.55 Consider, 
as an example, the way that sex equality emerged as a broadly 
accepted tenet of equal protection doctrine at roughly the same 
time that the proposed Equal Rights Amendment was close to 
ratification.56 The switch in time of 1937 provides other canoni-
cal examples, including a change in the scope of Congress’s 
enumerated powers57 and a change in the meaning of the proper-
ty rights protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.58 
The categorization of a given rule as Article V entrenched is 
therefore better understood as a judgment about the foreseeable 
future than as a judgment about the rule per se. In practice, Ar-
ticle V states the rule of entrenchment for those rules that, at 
the relevant time, are more easily changed by amendment than 
otherwise. Whether Article V is an easy or hard route to change 
relative to other possible mechanisms will vary over time with 
the state of opinion in the decisionmaking class. Sometimes it is 
easier to get the Court to change than it is to pass an amend-
ment, and sometimes the opposite is true. Understood in this 
light, describing a rule as Article V entrenched means that we 
do not foresee the Supreme Court’s reading the Constitution in a 
way that alters the existing rule, nor do we foresee the Court’s 
acquiescing if the other branches struck out in that direction. 
It is tempting to qualify the foregoing framework with the 
following proviso: for rules where the text is especially clear, Ar-
ticle V amendment is the only possible route to change. It is 
hard to imagine, for example, that any mechanism other than 
Article V could change the length of the president’s term from 
four years to three. That said, attention to historical examples of 
unanticipated change should encourage humility even with re-
spect to a prediction like this one. Part of what makes it easy to 
assume that the president’s term could not change without an 
Article V amendment is that the issue of presidential term 
length is not, in our experience, a matter of controversy. If large 
numbers of American officials came to believe that the four-year 
 
 55 See, for example, Primus, 109 Mich L Rev at 99–100 (cited in note 25); Strauss, 
114 Harv L Rev at 1462–63 (cited in note 50). 
 56 See Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677, 687–88 (1973) (discussing the relation-
ship between questions of sex equality under the Fourteenth Amendment and the then-
pending Equal Rights Amendment). 
 57 See NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 US 1, 30 (1937) (upholding provi-
sions of the National Labor Relations Act as valid exercises of Congress’s commerce power). 
 58 See West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish, 300 US 379, 391, 398–99 (1937) (upholding 
minimum wage legislation). 
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term was seriously flawed, pressure might mount to find ways to 
read the Constitution to solve the problem. In the absence of 
such pressure, the idea that the Constitution could be read to 
permit something other than a four-year term is likely to seem 
absurd. Maybe it would seem absurd under any circumstances; 
if I had to guess, I would hazard that the Republic will fall be-
fore the length of the president’s term changes without a formal 
amendment. But assuming that the substantive issue will not be 
controversial in our lifetimes, we may never know whether the 
text could be read differently.59 The point, in any case, is this: 
 
 59 We may never know, for example, if it could be read like this: Article II, Section 1 
says that the president “. . . shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years.” We have 
read “during the Term of four Years” to mean “for a four-year term.” But as a matter of 
ordinary language, something that happens “during” a specified time need not occupy 
the entirety of the time specified. Thanksgiving happens “during” November, but No-
vember is a longer period of time than Thanksgiving. So if the president were to serve a 
three-year term, he would hold his office “during the Term of four Years”—just not for 
the entirety of that period. Once this possible reading is in view, we should notice that 
the Constitution’s language describing the term lengths of other elected officials is dif-
ferent from that of Article II. Article I specifies that members of the House of Represent-
atives shall be chosen “every second Year.” Article II does not provide that presidential 
elections shall be held “every fourth year,” though obviously it could, so the difference 
suggests that the timetable for presidential elections is more variable than that for 
House elections. And with respect to the Senate, both Article I and the Seventeenth 
Amendment provide that Senators shall be elected “for six years.” That straightforward 
formulation indicates that the Constitution knows how to specify a concrete term length 
when it wants to do so. Article II could have said that the president would be elected “for 
four years,” but it doesn’t. It sets a limit by saying that the term shall be “during” four 
years. Presumably, therefore, the president’s length of service could be set at something 
shorter than four years, say by the terms of a statute passed under Congress’s power to 
make laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested in the 
federal government.  
 In the world of constitutional interpretation in the year 2013, the preceding argu-
ment is completely implausible (as would be any other argument for a presidential term 
lasting more or less than four years). We all know that “during the Term of four Years” 
in Article II means “for four years.” And we aren’t wrong. What we do not and cannot 
know is whether our successors would share our conviction on that point, if somehow 
they came to believe urgently that the good of the Republic required presidents to serve 
shorter terms. Under that pressure, they might sincerely understand the text differently 
from us—whether in accordance with the interpretation I have sketched above or in 
some other way that I do not presently imagine, as we today accept readings of the Con-
stitution that would have been implausible to our predecessors generations ago. 
 My willingness to guess that the length of the presidential term will not change 
without formal amendment thus does not rely only on the text of Article II. It also relies 
on the fact of visible, salient, consistent practice. We all have lived experience of the 
four-year cycle, and we all know that it goes all the way back to the beginning. Accord-
ingly, everyone would recognize a new textual interpretation as a change. And given how 
thoroughly and unambiguously Americans are aware that the four-year term has been 
consistent from the beginning, everyone would probably understand that change as a 
new departure rather than as the recovery of a correct but now-lost reading. That the 
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given how many once-absurd readings of the Constitution have 
become judicial doctrine, respect for the adaptability of our suc-
cessors should prompt us to qualify even our most confident in-
tuitions about what the text could not possibly accommodate. 
4. Judicial review. 
If the judiciary has in fact enforced some rule with an exer-
cise of judicial review, I will take it as established that that rule 
can be adduced as an example of something to which judicial re-
view attaches. To reduce controversy, I will draw examples from 
exercises of judicial review whose legitimacy is not the subject of 
heated current debate. 
For all the reasons that negatives are hard to prove, it is 
more difficult to demonstrate that a particular rule is not en-
forceable through judicial review. Even if the Supreme Court de-
clares an issue not fit for judicial resolution today, a somewhat 
different presentation of the issue might provoke the Court to 
assert itself tomorrow.60 But with that caveat duly noted, I will 
take the Court’s statements about nonjusticiability as guides to 
what competent practitioners should reasonably understand 
about the practice that currently exists. When I go beyond that 
boundary in characterizing something as nonjusticiable, I will 
try to limit myself to strongly supportable intuitions and to note 
the limits of what can be predicted. 
B. Unbundling 
The next page contains a four-by-four table depicting all of 
the possible ways in which text, supremacy, Article V entrench-
ment, and judicial review can be pulled apart. Some of the boxes 
in the table require little elucidation, and others call for consid-
erably more. In what follows, I discuss the possible combinations 
in order, beginning in the top-left corner and moving down the 
columns, skipping the four boxes that are not applicable for ob-
vious logical reasons. The point of the exercise is to show that—
 
four-year term is visible, salient, and has been consistently practiced would thus make it 
more difficult for constitutional entrepreneurs to propose alternatives to the relevant 
text of Article II than to propose alternative readings of other texts that are no more 
“clear” as a matter of pure textual interpretation. 
 60 For a canonical example, contrast Colegrove v Green, 328 US 549, 552 (1946) (de-
claring nonjusticiable a challenge to an electoral districting plan), with Baker v Carr, 369 
US 186, 208–10 (1962) (declaring such a challenge justiciable when presented as an 
equal protection claim rather than a Guarantee Clause claim). 
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with one exception—a rule with one or more of these character-
istics might or might not have any of the others. 
FIGURE 1 
 In the Text Supreme Law Article V  
Entrenched 
Judicial  
Review 
But Not in the 
Text 
n/a ●Congress may 
not move 
Election Day 
for partisan 
reasons. 
●States must 
permit popular 
voting in 
presidential 
elections. 
●The president 
may not order 
military  
personnel to 
attend Catholic 
Mass just 
before battle. 
●Congress may 
not segregate 
schools by race. 
●States are 
immune from 
damage actions 
brought by 
their own 
citizens. 
But Not  
Supreme Law 
●Mandatory 
jury trial in 
criminal cases. 
●Six-year 
Senate term 
(for new 
states). 
●Presidential 
presentment of 
proposed 
amendments. 
 
n/a ●Mandatory 
jury trial in 
criminal cases. 
●6-year Senate 
term (for new 
states). 
●Presidential 
presentment of 
proposed 
amendments. 
●Exclusionary 
rule. 
●Dormant 
commerce 
restrictions. 
●Constitutional 
default rules 
generally. 
But  
Changeable 
without Art V 
Amendment 
●None  
(actually  
bundled). 
●Holdings of 
Roe v Wade 
and Citizens 
United v FEC. 
●Two-term 
presidential 
limit prior to 
1940.  
 
n/a ●Constitutional 
default rules. 
●Holdings of 
Roe v Wade 
and Citizens 
United v FEC. 
But Not  
Enforceable 
through  
Judicial  
Review 
●Political 
questions. 
●Two-term 
presidential 
limit prior to 
1940. 
●Supreme 
Court has nine 
members. 
●Supreme 
Court has nine 
members. 
n/a 
 
 
1. Text without supremacy. 
We start at one of the hardest points, so the explanation of 
this box will take considerably more space than the explanation 
of any other box. 
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Many earlier commentators have noticed that a great deal 
of American constitutional law rests on nontextual founda-
tions.61 But most of them have maintained that the text is simp-
ly underinclusive of the operative content of constitutional law. 
On that view, constitutional law contains things that are not in 
the text, but everything in the text is respected as constitution-
al law.62 
The idea that every rule stated in the text of the Constitu-
tion is a constitutional rule makes sense at the level of labels. It 
is entirely ordinary to use the term “constitutional” to describe 
any rule stated in the Constitution. It does not follow, however, 
that all rules stated in the text enjoy the payoffs that might flow 
from constitutional status. As is germane to the box under dis-
cussion, several rules stated in the constitutional text are not 
treated as supreme law. They are routinely ignored and violated. 
Before giving examples of these nonsupreme (and indeed 
non-operative) rules, it is worth noting again that my view relies 
on a willingness to limit the range of meanings that can be at-
tributed to a text. It is possible to maintain that every rule con-
tained in a text is followed, so long as one is willing to read the 
text in whatever nonstandard way is necessary to make that 
text match prevailing practice. Just as the community of consti-
tutional interpreters has found creative ways to locate previous-
ly nontextual ideas within the constitutional text, it can find 
ways to read out of the text any rules that do not conform to ac-
cepted constitutional law.63 
It is a normal dynamic of American constitutional interpre-
tation that people struggle to close the gap between the text and 
the set of rules that are recognized as entitled to supremacy, en-
trenchment, and judicial review.64 Pressure to generate readings 
 
 61 See Strauss, The Living Constitution at 34–35 (cited in note 12); Black, Structure 
and Relationship at 11, 29–32 (cited in note 32); Grey, 27 Stan L Rev at 706–07 (cited in 
note 7); Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 3–5 (cited in note 16). 
 62 See, for example, Grey, 37 Stan L Rev at 1–3 (cited in note 8) (identifying non-
textualists as “supplementers” because their position is that constitutional authority in-
cludes more than just the text). 
 63 See generally Pamela S. Karlan and Daniel R. Ortiz, Constitutional Farce, in 
William N. Eskridge Jr and Sanford Levinson, eds, Constitutional Stupidities, Constitu-
tional Tragedies 180 (NYU 1998) (arguing that the conventions of constitutional argu-
ment are sufficiently flexible so that it is always possible to articulate an interpretation 
that would avoid an unwanted outcome). 
 64 See Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the Extraconstitu-
tional Rule of Recognition, in Matthew D. Adler and Kenneth Einar Himma, eds, The 
Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution 69, 69–83, 86–87 (Oxford 2009) (discussing 
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under which the text contains no ignored rules starts to build as 
soon as people realize that we presently lack canonical explana-
tions for why rules that an untutored reader might (easily) find 
in the text are really not there at all. My claim, then, is simply 
that competent readers of English who do not know the practice 
that the text is supposed to match would find in the text several 
rules that are not followed in practice. 
Here are three examples. 
1)  Trial by jury in criminal trials. Article III provides as fol-
lows: “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, 
shall be by Jury . . . .”65 In practice, many criminal trials in Arti-
cle III courts take place without juries. To be sure, defendants 
may demand jury trials if they wish.66 But defendants are also 
routinely permitted to choose bench trials if they would prefer to 
be tried by judges.67 The text of Article III, however, is written in 
inflexible terms: “The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury.” 
It is not hard to understand why practice departs from the 
text on this point. We understand jury trial mostly as a measure 
for the protection of defendants, and nothing strikes us as bi-
zarre or upsetting about a bench trial if the defendant prefers to 
proceed that way. State courts routinely hold bench trials, so our 
general sense of what makes a trial a trial accommodates trial 
by judge as well as trial by jury. To insist on a jury trial over a 
defendant’s objection might seem otiose, not to mention cumber-
some and expensive. To be sure, one could imagine a regime that 
regarded jury trial as sufficiently important as to be nonwai-
vable by the defendant. Indeed, the untutored reader of Article 
III would think that the United States Constitution establishes 
such a regime. But it seems not to. For generations, Article III 
courts have held bench trials with the consent of defendants. 
That dominant practice has shaped what I have elsewhere 
called our constitutional expectations.68 And as often happens, 
our constitutional expectations have the power to divert our at-
tention from the words in the text. 
 
the tendency to shoehorn nontextual norms into arguments about the Constitution’s 
text). 
 65 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 3. 
 66 See, for example, United States v Gaudin, 515 US 506, 511 (1995). 
 67 See, for example, United States v Hanjuan Jin, 833 F Supp 2d 977, 980 (ND Ill 
2012) (bench trial); United States v Weaks, 840 F Supp 2d 12, 17 (DDC 2012) (bench 
trial). 
 68 Primus, 109 Mich L Rev at 93–94 (cited in note 25). 
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The words are still there, of course, in every printed copy of 
the Constitution. It should therefore be a straightforward mat-
ter to say that the text of the Constitution announces, as a rule, 
that criminal trials in Article III courts must be jury trials. But 
no such rule operates as supreme law in the United States. 
2)  Six-year Senate term for new states. Article I and the 
Seventeenth Amendment both specify that US senators are 
elected for six-year terms.69 That is in fact the operative rule for 
most senators. But think about the seventy-eight senators com-
prising the initial delegations from states admitted to the Union 
after the First Congress convened. Those thirty-nine states—
that is, the thirty-seven that were not signatories to the Decla-
ration of Independence plus North Carolina and Rhode Island, 
both of which ratified the Constitution only after the First Con-
gress was sitting—became eligible to elect senators at a whole 
range of points on the calendar and in odd-numbered as well as 
even-numbered years. Their initial senators were all elected for 
lengths of time that would integrate them into the electoral cy-
cle on which one-third of the Senate begins a new six-year term 
every two years. From Samuel Johnston of North Carolina, who 
was elected for a three-year term, to Hiram Fong of Hawaii, 
whose initial term was four and a half years, those senators 
have been elected for a whole variety of term lengths correspond-
ing to nothing that appears in the text of the Constitution.70 
This approach to senatorial terms for new states is reasona-
ble. It is in some ways simpler, perhaps more elegant, and may-
be in modern times less expensive for senators to be elected in 
three big groups than to have Senate seats up for reelection at 
dozens of different dates, corresponding to the many points in 
the six-year cycle at which each new state sent its first senators. 
But the reigning approach is not prescribed by the text. Indeed, 
it contradicts the text, which states that each senator is elected 
for a six-year term.71 And although the existing system is rea-
sonable, it is not the only way that the situation could be han-
dled. It is perfectly conceivable to imagine senatorial elections 
occurring on a rolling basis rather than in big batches every two 
 
 69 US Const Art I, § 3, cl 1; US Const Amend XVII. 
 70 I thank Louis Seidman for pointing out this example to me. See Louis Michael 
Seidman, Acontextual Judicial Review, 32 Cardozo L Rev 1143, 1153–54 & n 47 (2011).  
 71 US Const Amend VXII. One could read US Const Art I, § 3, cl 2 to mean that the 
two senators comprising each state’s initial delegation should serve terms of different 
lengths, but the only options for length of term given in the text are two years, four 
years, and six years. No text authorizes a three-year term or a four-and-a-half-year term. 
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years. The Senate already considers itself a “continuing body” 
rather than one whose business stops and starts as each class is 
elected.72 A rolling electoral calendar might bring reality more in 
line with that conception. 
The point here is not that we would be better off if senators 
were elected at times scattered through the calendar than we 
are under the present system. It might be better and it might be 
worse. The point is merely that the existing system declines to 
implement a clearly stated textual rule and that we should not 
rationalize the departure on the ground that strict compliance 
with the text would be crazy or impossible. It wouldn’t. We simp-
ly have a practice, reasonable on its own terms and sanctioned 
by tradition stretching back to the beginning, of overriding the 
term-length rule that is stated in the text.73 
This example of accepted practice contradicting constitu-
tional text is noteworthy because the violated text is of a kind 
that the literature generally assumes to be reliably and strictly 
observed. Even leading nontextualists generally write as if some 
constitutional texts are reliably treated as supreme and unam-
biguous law, and the most common illustrations of such texts 
are numerical rules stating either age qualifications for holding 
office or the length of time for which officeholders are elected.74 
This is not quite so. Even in the supposed heartland of textual 
rules, the text does not always state the operative constitutional 
rule. 
3)  Presidential presentment of proposed amendments. The 
second Presentment Clause of Article I, § 7, states that 
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence 
of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary 
 
 72 See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the “Continuing Body” Theory of 
the Senate, 95 Iowa L Rev 1401 (2010) (describing and criticizing this conception). 
 73 To be sure, and in contrast to the example about jury trial under Article III, this 
textual rule has not been overridden in more than fifty years. But it has been consistent-
ly overridden whenever the occasion has presented itself, and it would be overridden 
again in the future if a new state were to be admitted. 
 74 See, for example, David A. Strauss, On the Origin of Rules (with Apologies to 
Darwin): A Comment on Antonin Scalia’s The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 75 U Chi L 
Rev 997, 1006 (2008): 
There are provisions of the Constitution that do prescribe rules or, in any 
event, that do not leave much room for discretion. There are provisions that 
use numbers, for example—for the minimum ages of federal officials, for those 
officials’ terms in office, for the number of senators per state, and for how often 
a census is to be conducted—and at least the numerical aspects of those rules, 
read naturally, do not permit the exercise of much discretion. 
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(except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to 
the President of the United States; and before the Same 
shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disap-
proved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate 
and House of Representatives.75 
Like the jury trial clause, the Presentment Clause speaks in to-
talizing and mandatory terms. Every order, resolution, or vote of 
Congress shall require presidential approval (or a congressional 
override of the president’s veto) in order to become effective. 
In practice, however, some prominent congressional orders, 
resolutions, and votes go into effect without being either signed 
by the president or repassed by Congress. Notably, Congress 
proposes constitutional amendments by the joint resolution of 
both Houses,76 and proposed amendments do not go through the 
presentment procedure. Amendments go into effect upon ratifi-
cation by the states, with no stop at the president’s desk.77 
Again, the rule stated in the text does not seem to operate as 
supreme law.78 
As noted before, my claim—that certain practices whose 
propriety is taken for granted in American law affirmatively 
contradict rules stated in the text of the Constitution—may not 
 
 75 US Const Art I, § 7, cl 3. 
 76 The text provides for amendments to be proposed either by joint supermajority 
resolution in Congress or by a convention that Congress shall call on the application of 
two-thirds of the state legislatures. See US Const Art V. Only the supermajority resolu-
tion has ever been implemented to adopt an actual amendment, so the discussion above 
is limited to that version of the process.  
 77 To be precise, twenty-six of twenty-seven amendments have skipped presidential 
presentment. The sole exception is the Thirteenth Amendment, which President Lincoln 
did sign before it was sent to the states for ratification. 
 78 Early litigation under the Eleventh Amendment brought this issue to the Su-
preme Court, which conspicuously failed to provide a textual explanation for the prac-
tice. In Hollingsworth v Virginia, 3 US 378 (1798), one of the claims the Court confronted 
was precisely that the Eleventh Amendment was invalid because it had not complied 
with the presentment requirement. Justice Samuel Chase provided the Court’s sole re-
sponse to this contention as follows: “There can, surely, be no necessity to answer that 
argument. The negative of the President applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation: 
He has nothing to do with the proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the Constitu-
tion.” Id at 381. Justice Chase’s dictum states the operative supreme law perfectly, and it 
makes not the slightest gesture toward explaining how the text could be read to accord 
with that supreme law. More recently, the Supreme Court of Wyoming has interpreted 
the language of the Wyoming Constitution’s presentment requirement, whose wording is 
in relevant part identical to that of Article V, to invalidate a proposed amendment that 
was not presented to the governor. See Geringer v Bebout, 10 P3d 514, 523 (Wyo 2000). 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming charitably described the US Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Hollingsworth as “not contained in that Court’s decision.” Id. 
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persuade all readers. In part because enterprising interpreters 
can find ways to read the Constitution to mean things that peo-
ple had not previously understood it to mean, it seems likely 
that the Constitution could be read to be consistent with prevail-
ing practice on the points I have raised. To be clear, I am not 
endorsing the position that the text might mean anything. To 
use Don Herzog’s example, I doubt that the Constitution could 
be read as the story of a small boy growing up in Kansas during 
the Great Depression.79 I mean instead to make an observation 
about our capacity to read the Constitution to mean the sort of 
things that we believe it would make sense for it to mean—to 
accord, that is, with our constitutional expectations. Thus, the 
reason why a skilled and dogged textualist should be able to 
generate the interpretations he needs to persuade himself (and 
others) that the text of the Constitution does not contain the 
rules I adduce above is only partly a matter of the indetermina-
cy of textual meaning. It is also a function of the fact that 
properly socialized Americans believe that defendants should be 
able to waive jury trials, that one-third of the whole Senate 
should be elected every two years, and that the First Amend-
ment is a valid part of the Constitution. 
It is not hard to imagine what such readings might look 
like. Indeed, it is fun to engage in the exercise of trying to gener-
ate them.80 The important point, though, is that no such readings 
 
 79 Don Herzog, As Many as Six Impossible Things before Breakfast, 75 Cal L Rev 
609, 629 (1987). 
 80 Here are some examples: 
 (1) One might deny that Article III makes jury trial mandatory in criminal cases by 
mobilizing the word “right” in the language of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees 
criminal defendants “the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” This use of the term 
“right,” the textualist might say, indicates that the accused has the option of a trial. To 
be sure, the term “right” does not always describe an option, see generally Richard A. 
Primus, The American Language of Rights (Cambridge 1999), but the term does bear 
that meaning often enough to make such a reading of the Sixth Amendment plausible as 
a prima facie matter. One could then privilege that interpretation of the Sixth Amend-
ment over the apparent plain meaning of Article III in either of two ways. First, one 
could say that the Sixth Amendment overrides Article III wherever the two conflict be-
cause the Sixth Amendment was adopted two years later. See Schick v United States, 
195 US 65, 68–69 (1904) (endorsing this reading in dicta). Alternatively, one could say 
that the two clauses should be read to reflect the same basic idea, that any conflict be-
tween them should be resolved by giving each clause a reasonable rather than a literal 
meaning, and that the apparently inflexible language of Article III is reasonably read 
just as a way of emphasizing the importance of the jury trial right. As I have described 
elsewhere, we can think of these two reconciliations as reflecting hard-textualist and 
soft-textualist approaches, respectively, where the hard textualist insists on a close reading 
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of the words and the soft textualist argues that one should not read literally what is 
meant to be read reasonably. As it happens, the Supreme Court long ago chose a soft-
textualist reconciliation on this point. See Patton v United States, 281 US 276, 298–99 
(1930) (holding that the mandatory language of Article III could not actually have been 
intended to make jury trial mandatory). In my own view, neither of these readings 
makes sufficient sense of the text. Given the normal practice of disfavoring implied re-
peal of constitutional text, it would make more sense to read the Sixth Amendment as 
guaranteeing that the accused’s (mandatory) jury trial would be speedy and public, and 
that the jury would be impartial and local, rather than as sub silentio jettisoning the re-
quirement of jury trial stated in Article III. But the fact that a reading is textually less 
sensible than some other reading does not guarantee that that reading will not emerge 
as the official account of a constitutional practice, especially when that practice is of gen-
erally accepted validity. 
 (2) One might reconcile the practice of varied term lengths for a state’s inaugural 
senators by describing the election of such a senator as the filling of a vacancy rather 
than as an election of its own. Article I, § 3 is reasonably read to imply that senators 
elected to fill vacancies should not serve full six-year terms but instead should serve only 
as long as is necessary to effectuate the policy “that one third [of all senators] may be 
chosen every second Year.” US Const Art I, § 3, cl 2. To be sure, it may seem odd to think 
of election to a new office as the filling of a vacancy. Both as a matter of ordinary lan-
guage and in the context of § 3, “vacancy” seems to refer to the condition that obtains 
when an existing office lacks an occupant, and the inaugural senators from new states 
have generally not assumed offices that ever existed in that empty state. Instead, these 
senators have generally taken office immediately upon the states’ admission to the Un-
ion, such that the office is occupied as soon as it comes into existence. (The selection of 
officeholders has taken place before the effective date of admission precisely so as to 
avoid leaving the seats “vacant.”) And for what it may be worth, early interpreters seem 
to have thought that a “vacancy” in the context of Article II could arise only when an in-
cumbent departed the position. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry 
(May 3, 1799), in Harold C. Syrett, ed, 23 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 94, 94 (Co-
lumbia 1976) (“Vacancy . . . presupposes that the Office has been once filled.”); Edmund 
Randolph, Opinion on Recess Appointments (July 7, 1792), in John Catanzariti, ed, 24 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 165, 165–66 (Princeton 1990). I doubt that this problem 
would prevent committed textualists from judging, sincerely, that the vacancy exception 
is a valid textual ground for the practice: again, our constitutional expectations do a lot 
to make otherwise-awkward textual interpretations seem perfectly reasonable. I note, 
however, that if the terms of inaugural senators were intended to comply with the con-
stitutional text by virtue of the vacancy exception, one might expect new states to ob-
serve a convention of leaving the seat unoccupied for a day, or even an hour, before fill-
ing it. No such convention exists, in part because no one has bothered to invoke the 
vacancy-filling idea as a means of reconciling this practice with the text. As with the 
waiver of jury trial, the prevailing practice is simply to do something that seems intui-
tively sensible and not to mind, or even notice, that the text says something else. 
 (3) One could argue that the presentment procedures make no sense as applied to 
proposed constitutional amendments because the necessary vote for congressional ap-
proval of such proposals—two-thirds of each house—is the same as that required to over-
come a veto. See US Const Art I, § 7. If one assumes that Congress could override any 
veto of a proposed amendment, one might think that insisting on presentment is point-
less. But as experienced lawmakers know, the fact that one can muster the support to 
pass something once does not always mean that one has enough support to pass the 
same thing twice, even with the same legislature in place, so this argument does not 
quite establish what it purports to even on its own terms. Alternatively, one could argue 
that the requirements of Article I, § 7 do not apply to Article V amendments because 
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are now part of the shared consciousness of American constitu-
tional practitioners. Reconciling readings of the text would be 
called into existence and made conventional only as a way of re-
solving the dissonance that people would experience if the mis-
match between prevailing practice and an untutored reading of 
the text were brought into the foreground. As long as that mis-
match remains out of sight, there is constitutional text that does 
not function as supreme law. More generally, we should be 
aware that our inclination to see instances of non-operative con-
stitutional text as few and marginal is predicated on our will-
ingness to forgo reading constitutional clauses in ways that they 
surely could be read as a matter of textual interpretation. The 
Sixth Amendment’s statement that “[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury”81 could easily be read to mean that 
the right to jury trial attaches in (not to put too fine a point on 
it) all criminal prosecutions. We don’t read it that way; we un-
derstand the jury trial guarantee to exclude petty offenses, even 
when denominated criminal.82 Without the power and wide-
spread acceptance of many reconciling readings like that one, 
inoperative constitutional text would be more pervasive.83 
 
Article V states its own conditions for the validity of measures enacted thereunder. If 
those conditions are exclusive, the presentment requirement of Article I would not apply. 
One problem with this argument, though, is that the language of Article I seems totaliz-
ing. It provides that “Every” measure to which both Houses must agree must be present-
ed. Note too that congressional enactments under all other articles of the Constitution—
not just those enacted under Article I—are treated as if the Presentment Clause meant 
what it says. Congressional reorganizations of the judiciary under Article III must be 
presented to the president, as must measures exercising the various powers given to 
Congress in Article IV (that is, the power to prescribe interstate comity under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, the power to admit new states, and the power to make rules 
governing federal territory and disposing of federal property). Statutes adopted under 
the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-
Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments are treated as subject to the presentment re-
quirements of Article I, as is the exercise of the substantive congressional powers con-
ferred in the Sixteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-Third, and Twenty-Fifth Amendments. (The 
joker in the deck is congressional confirmations as specified in the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, namely the confirmation of a new vice president and the decision as to 
whether a disabled president is fit to resume office; to date, there is scant practice under 
these provisions, and it is easy to imagine presidents skipping signatures in both situa-
tions.) Considered in this context, a claim that Article V is exempt resembles special 
pleading—which, again, does not mean that the argument would not be persuasive to a 
motivated audience.  
 81 US Const Amend VI. 
 82 See Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145, 159–61 (1968). 
 83 Some interpreters identify certain constitutional texts as failing to operate as 
supreme law precisely because they endorse readings of the text that are not obvious to 
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2. Text and formal entrenchment. 
We come now to the one combination of constitutional ele-
ments that does seem to travel in a bundle all the time. If a rule 
appears in the text of the Constitution, the statement of the 
rule—not the content of the rule or its practical operation, but 
the textual statement of the rule—cannot be changed except by 
Article V amendment. To be sure, the content of the rule might 
change. In practice, the content of textual rules sometimes 
changes without formal amendments, often as a result of devel-
opments in judicial doctrine. “[N]o Warrants shall issue, but up-
on probable cause”84 is a rule that has been understood to permit 
at some times what it has prohibited at others, even though the 
text of the rule has not been changed.85 What does not change 
except by Article V amendment is the words of the Constitution 
itself.86 The fact that the text does not change except by amend-
ment has consequences for constitutional law even if the en-
trenchment of the text does not guarantee entrenchment of any 
particular content. The text is an important and easily mobilized 
resource in constitutional argument, and the set of persuasive 
 
all other readers. Professor Ernest Young, for example, regards the prevailing permis-
sive doctrine toward congressional delegations to administrative agencies as abrogating 
the Vesting Clause of Article I, which states that “All legislative Powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” See Young, 117 Yale L J at 446–47 
(cited in note 11). It is not clear, of course, that a nondelegation rule must be read into 
those words: that a power is vested in Pablo might say nothing about whether he may 
authorize Tyrone to exercise the power as his agent. (My edition of Black’s Law Diction-
ary specifies that a “vested estate” includes a right of alienation. See Black’s Law Dic-
tionary 809 (abridged 5th ed 1983).) Professor Young reads the Vesting Clause as he 
reads it, though, and on his reading delegation is prohibited, which means that in his 
view Article I, § 1 should be added to the list of constitutional texts that do not operate 
as supreme law. The point, of course, is simply that the extent to which we recognize 
nonsupreme constitutional text is a function of how assiduously we conform our sense of 
the right readings of the text to the practice that actually prevails. 
 84 US Const Amend IV. 
 85 Contrast, for example, Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 655–57 (1961) (excluding evi-
dence gathered in warrantless search), with Wolf v Colorado, 338 US 25, 33 (1949) (per-
mitting the admission of such evidence). 
 86 Or at least it never has so far; one can generate far-flung hypothetical circum-
stances in which such change might be possible. To date, however, it does describe Amer-
ican constitutional practice well to say that the text itself changes only with formal 
amendments. One might also add the caveat that whether the Constitution has been 
formally amended as prescribed in Article V is itself sometimes a contestable question. 
See, for example, Bruce Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations 197–98 (Belknap 
1998) (raising doubts about whether the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in accord-
ance with Article V’s requirements); Laurence H. Tribe, The Invisible Constitution xix–
xx (Oxford 2008) (describing controversy over whether the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 
was validly adopted). 
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arguments that are easily made would shift if the text were to 
change. That said, the fact that text and formal entrenchment 
are authentically bundled together is less consequential on this 
understanding than it would be if entrenching the text were tan-
tamount to entrenching the content of an operative rule of law. 
3. Text without judicial review. 
This separation is well known under the heading of the po-
litical question doctrine. To take one of the classic examples, the 
text contains a rule stating that the United States will guaran-
tee each state a republican form of government.87 Courts will not 
enforce the rule.88 
4. Supremacy without text. 
The text of Article I empowers Congress to set the date on 
which congressional elections are held,89 and the text of Article 
II empowers state legislatures to decide how each state’s presi-
dential electors will be appointed.90 As a matter of plain reading, 
these authorizations permit legislators to pursue their partisan 
interests far beyond the point where American officeholders feel 
themselves required to stop acting in a partisan fashion. What 
restrains their pursuit of partisan interest is the sense that it 
would violate the rules. 
Consider Congress first. If both Houses of Congress had ma-
jorities of the same political party, and assuming also a friendly 
president or veto-proof supermajorities, Congress could set the 
date of each federal election in a way calculated to maximize the 
chances that the party in power would prevail. Maybe the in-
cumbents would do better if elections were held in June, when 
the economy will probably be good, than in November, when 
things might have gone sour. The national legislatures of other 
democracies engage in such gamesmanship regularly,91 but 
 
 87 See US Const Art IV, § 4. 
 88 See Luther v Borden, 48 US 1, 42 (1849). As noted earlier, statements about 
what courts will not do are limited by our inability to foresee all the ways in which the 
future might be different from the past. See Part I.A.4. Perhaps under some future cir-
cumstance a court would in fact enforce the Guarantee Clause. What we can say now is 
that prevailing doctrine includes a principle against the judicial enforcement of that 
Clause and that courts to date have conformed, at least officially, to that doctrine.  
 89 US Const Art I, § 4, cl 1. 
 90 US Const Art II, § 1, cl 2. 
 91 See, for example, Fixed-Term Parliaments Bill, 515 Parl Deb, HC (6th ser) 621 
(2010); Robert Hazell, Fixed Term Parliaments 5, 10–15 (UCL 2010); Peers End Deadlock 
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Congress never does, even at a time in history when the parties 
seem bent on extracting every possible bit of partisan advantage 
in other ways. 
Similarly, state legislatures might allocate electoral votes by 
themselves, rather than risking the possibility that the citizen-
electorate might vote for the other party’s presidential candi-
date. In Michigan, both houses of the legislature presently have 
Republican majorities and the governor is a Republican. In the 
last presidential election, Michigan’s electoral votes went to the 
Democratic candidate, and predictably so. The text of Article II 
indicates that the legislature was not required to permit that 
outcome. It could have chosen, months before the election, to 
award Michigan’s electoral votes according to its own partisan 
preference. But well-socialized Americans know that, no matter 
what the text says, there are no foreseeable circumstances in 
which a state legislature would eliminate popular voting for 
presidential electors. Indeed, it would not happen even if doing 
so would yield the enormous political prize of changing the out-
come of a presidential election.92 
Actions like these are close to unthinkable because the rele-
vant officeholders understand themselves as bound to respect a 
certain set of rules, rules that legislatures cannot alter on their 
own authority.93 But neither rule is present in the text. On the 
 
over Fixed Term Parliaments (BBC News Sept 14, 2011), online at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14924982 (visited Sept 11, 2013). 
 92 In recent years, a few legislators have entertained the idea of splitting their 
states’ electoral votes in proportion to the statewide popular vote, rather than awarding 
the entire electoral slate to the winner of the popular vote. The motivations for this idea 
are understood to be partisan: the proposal surfaces in states where the partisan prefer-
ence of the legislature differs from the expected partisan preference of the state’s presi-
dential electorate, such that splitting the electoral vote proportionally would probably 
capture more votes for the legislature’s preferred candidate than a winner-take-all sys-
tem would. See, for example, Reid Wilson, The GOP’s Electoral College Scheme, Natl J 
(Dec 17, 2012), online at http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/on-the-trail 
/the-gop-s-electoral-college-scheme-20121217 (visited Sept 11, 2013). Today, Maine and 
Nebraska already operate on something other than a winner-take-all basis. Accordingly, 
it is not the case that the winner-take-all system functions as supreme law. What func-
tions as supreme law is the principle that the electors must be awarded pursuant to the 
popular vote. There is more than one way to translate a popular-vote result into a slate 
of electors, but no state considers skipping the popular vote and letting the legislature 
pick electors directly. 
 93 It is tempting to explain the behavior in part by reference to a fear of electoral 
blowback from a disgusted citizenry. Note, however, that in the example of congressional 
elections, that explanation is inapposite. By hypothesis, the majority party will do better 
electorally if it manipulates the date than if it doesn’t. Moreover, in both cases the idea 
that the voters would punish officeholders who exercised these powers rests on the idea 
that the electorate regards the legislature as subject to a higher norm.  
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contrary, a plain reading of the text authorizes the very things 
that the legislators regard as forbidden.94 
5. Supremacy without Article V entrenchment. 
In its pure form, the big-C theory maintains that no su-
preme rule of law can be changed, and no new such rule created, 
except through the mechanisms described in Article V. Almost 
everyone recognizes, though, that in practice the content of op-
erative constitutional law can be altered through a different 
mechanism: persuading a majority of the justices of the Su-
preme Court. Today, the holdings of controversial cases like Roe 
v Wade95 and Citizens United v Federal Election Commission96 
operate as supreme law in the United States. Many practition-
ers seek to change that supreme law. Their efforts are focused 
on securing changes in judicial decisionmaking, not on Article V 
amendments. If either group succeeds in changing the supreme 
law, it will almost surely be through the mechanism of judicial 
decisionmaking, not through Article V. 
Similarly, the earlier discussion of the two-term limit for 
presidents prior to 1940 provides an example of supreme law 
that can be changed without Article V. While it lasted, the two-
term limit operated as supreme law for the second of the two 
reasons articulated above: it was a norm that people did not at-
tempt to transgress even when it was in their interests to do so, 
because the relevant actors considered themselves to be under 
the authority of a rule. When the norm collapsed, Article V 
played no role.97 
6. Supreme law not enforceable through judicial review. 
The example of the two-term limit for presidents prior to 
1940 also illustrates that supreme law need not be judicially en-
forced. It seems likely that at no time in history would any court 
 
 94 This is not an example of supreme law that contradicts the text. Congress has 
chosen the November date for elections, and state legislatures have chosen to let popular 
voting allocate presidential electors. The point is simply that the operative supreme law 
today does not stop with the proposition that the legislatures choose. It continues to the 
proposition that the legislatures are not free to revise some of the choices that have al-
ready been made. 
 95 410 US 113 (1973). 
 96 558 US 310 (2010). 
 97 See Part I.A. 
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have blocked an attempt to violate the two-term rule, and in-
deed no court tried to block Roosevelt when he ran a third time. 
For another example with Rooseveltian overtones, consider 
the rule that the Supreme Court has nine justices. Despite fre-
quent manipulation of the number of justices during the nine-
teenth century,98 the rule that the number is fixed at nine seems 
now to have acquired the status of supreme law. Formally, the 
source of that rule is a statute that Congress could change like 
any other statute.99 Congress does not regard itself as free to ex-
ercise that power. 
Consider the enormous gains that a majority party could re-
alize by changing the size of the Court. Suppose that in 2009, 
Democratic supermajorities in Congress had expanded the Court 
to eleven members, thus giving President Obama two new ap-
pointments and the Court a majority of Democratic appointees. 
The safety of the Affordable Care Act100 would have been as-
sured, to say nothing of the consequences for abortion, campaign 
finance, and who knows what else. But the idea never arose—it’s 
simply off the table. 
That said, if Congress did decide to change the size of the 
Court, it is hard to imagine the courts declaring the change in-
valid.101 The judiciary lacks a language or a rubric for explaining 
why this statute, which Congresses changed for partisan ad-
vantage several times before the twentieth century, could not be 
changed again today. It seems, therefore, that the rule that the 
Supreme Court’s size is fixed at nine operates as supreme law 
but not as law that courts would enforce.102 
 
 98 See An Act Supplementary to the Act Entitled “An Act to Amend the Judicial 
System of the United States” § 1, 5 Stat 176, 176–78 (1837) (increasing the number of 
Justices from seven to nine); An Act to Provide Circuit Courts for the Districts of Cali-
fornia and Oregon, and for other Purposes § 1, 12 Stat 794, 794–95 (1863) (increasing the 
number to ten); An Act to Fix the Number of Judges of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, and to Change Certain Judicial Circuits, 14 Stat 209, 209–10 (1866) (reducing 
the number to seven); An Act to Amend the Judicial System of the United States § 2, 16 
Stat 44, 44–45 (1869) (increasing the number to nine). 
 99 See 28 USC § 1 (“The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief 
Justice of the United States and eight associate justices.”). 
 100 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”), Pub L No 
111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010). 
 101 See Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the Extraconstitutional Rule 
of Recognition at 70–71 (cited in note 64) (reaching the same conclusion). 
 102 Caution counsels us not to say with absolute certainty that the courts would not 
intervene. We cannot know the future, and courts sometimes develop previously unfore-
seen justifications for novel exercises of judicial review. Indeed, the sense that govern-
ment has transgressed a boundary that nobody ever believed could possibly be crossed 
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7. Article V entrenched without text. 
Suppose that the president, exercising his commander-in-chief 
power,103 orders military personnel to take Catholic communion 
on the eve of battle, believing sincerely that doing so will in-
crease the likelihood of military victory. Under present law, that 
order would violate the First Amendment right to the free exer-
cise of religion. The idea that the Free Exercise Clause can be 
applied against the president, however, is not one that can be 
derived by reading the words of the First Amendment. Those 
words announce a limitation on the powers of Congress, not the 
powers of the president. That said, the idea that the First 
Amendment binds the president as well as Congress is a deeply 
rooted part of the operative supreme law, and it is hard to imag-
ine its being changed by mere statute.104  
Given that the operative supreme law subjects the president 
to the dictates of the Free Exercise Clause, it is easy to assume 
that freeing the president from those strictures would require an 
Article V amendment. If that were so, the rule that the presi-
dent is bound by the Free Exercise Clause (or the First Amend-
ment more generally) would be an example of a nontextual rule 
that can only be changed through the process of Article V. But 
on careful consideration, the rule that the First Amendment ap-
plies to the president might not be entrenched by Article V as an 
operative matter, even though it clearly operates as supreme law. 
As discussed earlier, a rule is operatively Article V en-
trenched if no other avenue of change is as available as change 
by the Article V process. To be sure, no non–Article V process 
presently seems like a plausible route toward sheltering the 
president from the First Amendment. But Article V also seems 
like a complete nonstarter toward that end. A proposed constitu-
tional amendment authorizing the president to prohibit the free 
 
often inspires just such doctrinal developments. But this is true only sometimes. Some-
times the real enforcement mechanisms, such as they are, lie elsewhere. In cases like 
this one, “elsewhere” includes the internalized attitudes of officeholders, the fear of elec-
toral retribution, and some inarticulate combination of the two. Note too that the fear of 
electoral retribution rests on the assumption that the electorate regards the size of the 
Court as fixed by a law that the legislature is under an obligation not to transgress.  
 103 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States.”). 
 104 See Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 158 U Pa L Rev 1025, 1085 (2010) (noting “that the First Amendment bars Presi-
dent Obama from forcibly shutting down Fox News . . . is uncontroversially true, given 
the contemporary state of American constitutional law”). 
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exercise of religion would never get out of committee. One does 
not really report a practical feature of the constitutional system, 
therefore, by saying that Article V is what stands in the way of a 
change to this constitutional rule. What prevents a change to 
this rule is the near-complete absence of support for such a 
change. The practical role of Article V as the force holding the 
rule in place is reminiscent of the practical role of Lisa Simp-
son’s tiger-repellant rock: no tigers enter the town of Springfield 
when Lisa holds the rock, but only Homer Simpson thinks that 
the rock is what secures the outcome.105 For Article V to be the 
force entrenching the rule in a practically meaningful way, it 
would have to be the case that a movement to change the rule 
enjoyed some support and that the Article V process was the 
mechanism by which that movement was most likely to suc-
ceed—either because success through that route seemed plausi-
ble or because success through other routes seemed less plausi-
ble still. 
Perhaps we could imagine, in a dystopian vein or otherwise, 
a political future in which many people sought to give the presi-
dent more latitude to enforce the law or command the military 
without the pesky strictures of individual-rights claims like 
those that free exercise doctrine might support.106 Under those 
circumstances, identifying Article V as the measure of the rule’s 
entrenchment would make sense if the movement for change 
had enough support to persuade three-fourths of the state legis-
latures but not enough support to persuade the Supreme Court 
to revise the case law. (Change in the case law would make 
amendment unnecessary and demonstrate that the true meas-
ure of entrenchment had been the Court’s opposition rather than 
Article V.) So: Is it plausible to imagine that such a change 
would secure the broad political support necessary to navigate 
Article V before securing the support of five justices? 
When considering that question, bear in mind that the pres-
ident seeking the power to require military personnel to take 
communion would also be the president who most recently made 
 
 105 See The Simpsons: Much Apu about Nothing (Fox Television Broadcast May 5, 
1996). 
 106 Some commentators may think this general scenario is already not so far away, 
albeit applied to constitutional rights other than religious free exercise. See, for example, 
Noah Feldman, Obama’s Drone Attack on Your Due Process (Bloomberg Feb 8, 2013), 
online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-08/obama-s-drone-attack-on-your-due 
-process.html (visited Sept 11, 2013) (describing an administration white paper on the 
use of drone strikes as an evisceration of the constitutional guarantee of due process). 
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Supreme Court appointments. Bear in mind too that this presi-
dent would have been chosen by an electorate willing to have a 
president who would seek this power. Those facts might color 
our sense of how the Court might be disposed toward the ques-
tion. Consider also that the litigants trying to persuade the 
Court to change would insistently point to the text of the First 
Amendment, a plain reading of which would vindicate their po-
sition. Nontextual rules are easier for courts to enforce when 
public consensus regards those rules as obviously correct.107 In 
the absence of consensus, or in the face of broad-based opposi-
tion, a nontextual rule might be harder for judges to defend. By 
the time an Article V amendment becomes plausible, therefore, 
it might well not be necessary. 
That said, one can also imagine the Court’s holding its 
ground, at least for a while, and during that interval Article V 
would in fact be the easiest route to changing the constitutional 
rule. Suppose that the question of the president’s power to order 
troops to take communion came before a Court dominated by 
justices appointed fifteen years earlier, by a more civil-
libertarian president. Perhaps those justices would stand firm 
even as public opinion shifted. Finding themselves unable to 
persuade the Court, the president’s allies could mount a cam-
paign to amend the Constitution. If public opinion favored the 
president’s position broadly enough, the rule might change 
through Article V before the Court gave way. 
Short of intricate examples like these, it is hard to identify 
nontextual rules that one can confidently say are entrenched, in 
a practical sense, by the terms of Article V. That difficulty large-
ly reproduces the difficulty with knowing that any rule is Article 
V entrenched as an operative matter. Once an idea has enough 
support among decisionmakers to navigate the Article V process, 
it may also have enough support to be adopted without the need 
for Article V because enough decisionmakers (including judges) 
come to consider it sensible to understand existing constitution-
al law as already containing, or at least as already compatible 
with, that idea.108 Amendments are more likely to be necessary 
 
 107 See Richard Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 Geo Wash 
L Rev 1207, 1220–21, 1227–28 (2010) (explaining that public consensus can act as an 
independent source of authority in constitutional interpretation). 
 108 See Strauss, 114 Harv L Rev at 1462–63 (cited in note 50). It also sometimes 
happens that the decisionmaking class’s collective support for the merits of an idea still 
does not yield the view that the Constitution can be read to embody that idea. The 
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in instances when the Supreme Court is out of step with the 
bulk of the decisionmaking class. Under those circumstances, 
Article V offers an easier route to change than judicial revision. 
Accordingly, nontextual rules can be Article V entrenched when 
the Court is standing up for a nontextual rule that is broadly 
unpopular outside the Court. That is not the normal case, but it 
can happen from time to time. 
8. Article V entrenchment but not supreme law. 
Consider two observations described earlier in this Article. 
First, there are rules stated in the text of the Constitution that 
do not operate as supreme law.109 Second, the text of the Consti-
tution itself is Article V entrenched: we do not alter that text ex-
cept when Article V amendments are adopted.110 (The meaning 
we attribute to that text changes without amendments, but the 
text itself does not.) 
It follows from those two observations that the rules that 
are stated in the text but do not operate as supreme law are, to 
the extent that they are rules at all, rules entrenched by the 
terms of Article V. Thus, the text states that all criminal trials 
in Article III courts must be jury trials. No such rule is followed 
in practice. The rule is a rule in some nominal sense, not in an 
operative one. It is not the supreme law. But the statement of 
that rule that appears in Article III could be changed only by Ar-
ticle V amendment. 
Once again, the fact that these verbal formulas cannot be 
changed without amendments means considerably less than it 
would if those formulas stated operatively supreme rules of law. 
But the fact that the words remain even as practice fails to con-
form is not completely meaningless. The words in the text are 
always available as mobilizable resources in constitutional ar-
gument. If in the future there were a movement to eliminate 
federal bench trials, it would draw support from the language of 
Article III—language that would still be there to call upon, in 
spite of long practice in apparent derogation of the language, 
 
Twentieth, Twenty-First, and Twenty-Second Amendments—among others—are proba-
bly best understood in that vein. 
 109 See Part I.B.1 (text but not supreme law). 
 110 See Part I.B.2 (discussing text and formal amendment). 
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because the long practice did not eliminate the text. Only Article 
V amendment would do that.111 
9. Article V entrenched but not enforceable through 
judicial review. 
A rule falling into this category would be one that legisla-
tures believed themselves unable to change except by Article V 
amendment—or perhaps, one that legislatures considered inad-
visable to change except by Article V amendment—even though 
the courts would not get in the way of other attempted methods 
of change. 
Consider again the rule that the Supreme Court has nine 
members. Formally, the rule is statutory. If Congress were to 
amend 28 USC § 1 by increasing the number of justices to elev-
en, it is hard to imagine the Court striking the new statute 
down. That said, Congress seems strongly disinclined to change 
the size of the Court even when doing so would be to the mani-
fest advantage of the party in power. That disinclination stems 
from legitimacy concerns, derived perhaps partly from the his-
torical meaning of President Franklin Roosevelt’s court-packing 
plan and partly from a more abstract sense that the nine-justice 
Court should not be manipulated. If some future Congress felt it 
necessary to change the size of the Court, therefore, the relevant 
decisionmakers might think it safer to do so by Article V 
amendment, which seems like an unimpeachable method of 
change, than to make the change by statute. That judgment 
might be understood as prudential. One might say that Con-
gress legally could increase the size of the Court statutorily if it 
wanted to, such that it is misleading to say that such a change 
must go through Article V. But on the understanding that a rule 
is in practice Article V entrenched only when there is no easier 
route to change than Article V amendment, the relevant ques-
tion here is not whether there is some other method of change 
available. It is whether some other method of change is easier 
than Article V. And for the purpose of deciding whether Article 
V offers the easiest route to change, it makes little difference 
how the considerations making other routes more difficult than 
Article V are characterized. What matters is that if the change 
can be made at all, it will be made under Article V. 
 
 111 Or so we reasonably assume. Nothing in American practice to date has suggested 
another mechanism.  
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This example is speculative. Perhaps a Congress deter-
mined to have its way with the Court would act by statute re-
gardless of prudential considerations. Perhaps it would be 
backed by a sufficiently supportive public so as to eliminate the 
need for prudence—something that seems plausible if an Article 
V supermajority were willing to approve the change. Or perhaps 
Congress would proceed by statute, reluctantly, precisely be-
cause it lacked confidence that three-fourths of the states would 
climb on board. More optimistically, perhaps the scenario for en-
larging the Court would be one of partisan comity. If both major 
parties agreed that the Court needed eleven justices, Congress 
might pass a law adding two seats after the president had 
agreed to nominate someone chosen by the majority leader of the 
Senate—a member of the rival party—to one of the new seats, 
thus preventing the expansion from seeming like a partisan ma-
nipulation. For all of these reasons, it is possible to imagine cir-
cumstances under which the rule setting the size of the Court 
could be changed by statute, and in those circumstances the rule 
would not be Article V entrenched. But it is also possible to im-
agine circumstances in which Article V was the best or even the 
only plausible route to change, even though a statutory change 
would not be invalidated by an exercise of judicial review. 
10. Judicial review without text. 
States are immune from many federal statutory actions for 
damages brought by their own citizens, even though the text of 
the Eleventh Amendment speaks only of actions brought by citi-
zens of other states.112 Congress may not commandeer state ex-
ecutive officials.113 States may not purposely impede interstate 
commerce.114 The federal executive is bound by the First 
Amendment.115 All of these rules are enforced by courts exercis-
ing the power of judicial review. None of them is present in the 
text of the Constitution.116 Earlier, I illustrated a continuum of 
textuality along which constitutional rules can be arranged, and 
 
 112 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44, 54 (1996). 
 113 See Printz, 521 US at 935. 
 114 See Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 US 333, 348–
54 (1977). 
 115 See Fox Television Stations, 132 S Ct at 2317–19. 
 116 See Strauss, The Living Constitution at 32–49 (cited in note 12) (describing the 
common-law system of judicial review where cases are decided based on precedent, and 
the Constitution plays “at most, a ceremonial role”). 
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I noted that people might disagree about where along that con-
tinuum any particular rule falls.117 But as these examples show, 
many well-established judicially enforced rules are not taken 
from the text even on a reasonably generous understanding of 
what it means for a rule to be textual. 
11. Judicial review but not supreme law. 
Many rules often thought of as constitutional defaults fall in 
this category. Consider dormant commerce doctrine. Courts will 
invalidate state laws that purposely burden or discriminate 
against interstate commerce, but Congress can override the ju-
diciary and permit a state to burden interstate commerce in a 
way that the courts would otherwise forbid.118 The judicial re-
striction is defeasible by ordinary federal legislation and there-
fore not supreme law. Similarly, consider the exclusionary rule. 
Courts will exclude evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, but not if a legislature creates an adequate alter-
native remedy.119 
12. Judicial review but changeable without Article V 
amendment. 
Default rules like those just canvassed are on point again 
here. The exclusionary rule and the rules of dormant commerce 
doctrine can be changed by ordinary legislation. But there is al-
so another important set of rules falling into this category. The 
normal and easiest way to change many judicially enforced con-
stitutional rules is to persuade a majority of Supreme Court jus-
tices to revise or overrule existing doctrine, either by getting one 
or more sitting justices to reverse course or by waiting for the 
appointment of different justices. The rule that states may not 
unduly burden a woman’s choice to have an abortion and the 
rule that Congress may not prevent the use of corporate funds to 
pay for election advertisements are both rules that the courts 
now enforce through exercises of judicial review. Various actors 
now seek to change or eliminate one or both of these rules. They 
generally recognize that the path to change does not run 
through Article V. 
 
 117 See Part I.A. 
 118 See, for example, Hillside Dairy Inc v Lyons, 539 US 59, 66 (2003); Maine v Tay-
lor, 477 US 131, 138 (1986). 
 119 Mapp, 367 US at 651–53. 
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* * * 
The vision of constitutionality as a status with a single basis 
(the text) and three payoffs (supremacy, entrenchment, and ju-
dicial review) has some considerable virtues. It captures a great 
deal of what is supposed to be valuable about American consti-
tutionalism. It aligns with what most well-informed Americans 
would probably say if asked what it means for something to be a 
constitutional rule. It helps both to enable and to constrain the 
practice of judicial review. But it fails to describe the way the 
constitutional system operates in practice, and the failure does 
not consist in getting some marginal details wrong. In practice, 
many rules that exhibit one or more of these four properties do 
not exhibit one or more of the others. Perhaps most crucially, 
many rules that do not find their basis in the text are commonly 
called constitutional rules and exhibit other characteristics of 
constitutional rules, including enforcement through the power of 
judicial review. 
As noted above, few sophisticated practitioners contend that 
this bundled vision accurately captures exactly how constitu-
tional law operates in practice. For some, the bundled big-C vi-
sion or something like it is a critique of existing practice: to the 
extent that this vision does not map the practice, the argument 
runs, the practice is deficient. In my own view, existing practice 
makes more sense both practically and normatively than would 
a system in which all textual rules and only textual rules were 
supreme, entrenched, and judicially enforceable. But a full ex-
ploration of this normative controversy would take us far afield. 
For present purposes, it is enough to note that it is a mistake to 
think of constitutionality in practice as a bundled status, with 
text as the basis and the other three characteristics as reliable 
payoffs. 
Just as a person who is willing to indulge sufficiently moti-
vated readings of text can deny that any valid instances of judi-
cial review proceed without textual warrant, a person willing to 
indulge such readings can assert that every rule stated in the 
Constitution’s text—properly understood—operates as supreme 
law in the American system. People committed to holding to-
gether all of the sticks in big-C theory’s constitutional bundle 
must accordingly exhibit that indulgence. But as the pragmatist 
logicians taught, anything may be held true come what may, so 
long as one is prepared to do enough violence to everything 
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else.120 If innovative and fanciful readings are the price to be 
paid for maintaining the big-C bundle as a description of Ameri-
can practice, it should be clear that textuality will no longer be 
doing some of the central work that is claimed to be its virtue: 
that is, rendering the content of constitutional law stable and 
determinate. And if one thinks that a successful descriptive ac-
count of American constitutionality should be less tendentious, 
the big-C vision will not do the trick. It pays to consider alternatives. 
II.  THE SMALL-C BUNDLE(S) 
An important collection of constitutional-theory literature is 
based on the idea that the written Constitution is not the only 
source of constitutional authority.121 In current convention, this 
literature is often called “small-c” theory, because it focuses at-
tention on the small-c American “constitution”—that is, on a set 
of rules and norms and institutions that guide the process of 
government—rather than on the big-C “Constitution,” which is 
the 1787 document as amended.122 Small-c theories vary a fair 
amount on a variety of points, but they share an insistence on 
nontextual constitutionality. 
The basic small-c move can be understood as a partial un-
bundling of the idea of constitutionality. By distinguishing be-
tween textuality and constitutional status, small-c theories take 
one of the sticks in the big-C bundle—text—and contend that it 
can be separated from the others. Crucially, however, small-c 
theory tends not to unbundle the idea of constitutionality too 
much further. Like the big-C approach, small-c commonly pre-
sents constitutionality as a bundle of attributes, some of which 
are the bases of constitutionality and some of which are its payoffs. 
The idea of a set of payoffs that follow from constitutional 
status is crucial to much small-c thinking. After all, one major 
goal of much small-c theory is to justify the practice of nontextu-
al judicial review.123 Commonly, the strategy for doing so is to 
 
 120 See, for example, Willard Van Orman Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in 
Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View: Logico-Philosophical Essays 20 
(Harvard 1953). 
 121 See notes 9 and 11. See also Strauss, The Living Constitution at 34–35 (cited in 
note 12). 
 122 See, for example, Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 1 (cited in 
note 9); Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 29 (cited in note 6); Young, 117 Yale L J at 414 
(cited in note 11). 
 123 The work of Professors David Strauss and Thomas Grey provides examples. See 
generally Strauss, The Living Constitution (cited in note 12). See also Grey, 27 Stan L 
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show that something other than text is a legitimate basis of con-
stitutional status. To draw attention to something that usually 
is taken for granted, that strategy works if judicial review is a 
payoff of constitutional status. If it is, and if something other 
than text can underlie constitutional status, nontextual rules 
will be entitled to judicial review. But as illustrated earlier with 
respect to a simpler model, the idea that constitutionality is a 
status with a known set of payoffs is misleading.124 It remains 
misleading when applied to the more complex world of small-c 
constitutionalism. 
A. Six Sticks 
As noted above, small-c theory comes in many different va-
rieties, and different small-c theories focus on different aspects 
of constitutionality. Nonetheless, it is possible to capture the 
broad range of rules that small-c theorists deem constitutional 
by reference to six characteristics. Four of those characteristics 
are familiar from the big-C framework: text, supremacy, en-
trenchment, and judicial enforceability. As I will discuss, these 
concepts are sometimes understood in different and less formal 
ways within the rubric of small-c theory. To those four charac-
teristics, small-c theory adds two other concepts, each of which 
is a potential justification for treating a rule as constitutional. 
Drawing on Professor Charles Black, we can call one of those 
concepts “structure.”125 Modifying a suggestion by Professor Phil-
ip Bobbitt, we can call the other one “ethos.”126 Structure and 
ethos supplement or sometimes replace text as qualifying 
grounds for constitutional status. 
In what follows, I briefly describe what each of these six 
concepts means within the rubric of small-c theory. I begin with 
three apparent bases of constitutional status: text, structure, 
and ethos. I then consider judicial review, which is often the 
most important payoff of constitutional status but which is 
sometimes also a basis of that status. Finally, I consider 
 
Rev at 706–10 (cited in note 7). There are also important exceptions: sometimes small-c 
theory aims to explain why certain rules that have been thought constitutional should in 
fact not be enforced through judicial review. See, for example, Ackerman, 1 We the Peo-
ple: Foundations at 131–33 (cited in note 50); Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 40 (cited in 
note 16). 
 124 See Part I.B. 
 125 See Black, Structure and Relationship at 9–11, 29–32 (cited in note 32). 
 126 See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate at 90–106 (cited in note 12). 
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supremacy and entrenchment. These are generally understood 
as payoffs, albeit payoffs that small-c theory often understands 
in relatively fluid ways. 
1. Text. 
Small-c theory denies that all constitutional rules are textu-
al, but it does not usually deny that text plays an important role 
in identifying constitutional rules. On the contrary, most small-c 
theorists think of the text of the written Constitution as a suffi-
cient basis for a rule’s constitutionality.127 They simply insist 
that there are also other bases that can be sufficient in the ab-
sence of text.128 
2. Structure. 
Many constitutional propositions concern the structure of 
government. Indeed, on one understanding of the small-c term 
“constitution,” the structure and modes of operation of a gov-
ernment are exactly what that government’s constitution is.129 
This idea has many echoes in American small-c theory. Thus, 
the constitution in a small-c sense might be “the order and 
structure of the body politic,”130 or “the institutional arrange-
ments” that are “the fundamental political institutions of a soci-
ety.”131 In the same vein, constitutional rules might be those that 
tell us how lawmaking is done132 or, more broadly and metaphor-
ically, those that serve as the rules of the game.133 
For the pure big-C theorist, the structural propositions with 
constitutional status are the ones that can be found in the text 
 
 127 See, for example, Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 29 (cited in note 6) (describ-
ing the core of the difference between big-C and small-c perspectives as being the exclu-
sivity, vel non, of the text); Black, Structure and Relationship at 30–31 (cited in note 32). 
 128 See, for example Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 29 (cited in note 6); Strauss, 
63 U Chi L Rev at 904 (cited in note 15). 
 129 See, for example, Young, 117 Yale L J at 415–16 (cited in note 11); Tiedeman, 
The Unwritten Constitution at 16 (cited in note 11); Bagehot, The English Constitution at 
4–6 (cited in note 10); Aristotle, Constitution of Athens at 83, 113–16 (cited in note 10); 
Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 31 (cited in note 16). 
 130 Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution at 16 (cited in note 11). 
 131 Strauss, 114 Harv L Rev at 1459–60 (cited in note 50). 
 132 See William N. Eskridge Jr, America’s Statutory “constitution”, 41 UC Davis L 
Rev 1, 12 (2007). 
 133 See Levinson, 124 Harv L Rev at 700 (cited in note 9). 
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of the written Constitution.134 Within small-c theory, however, 
structure is often a source of constitutional authority going con-
siderably beyond the text.135 The main thrust of Professor 
Charles Black’s canonical lectures on constitutional structure, 
for example, was that judges confronting constitutional ques-
tions whose substance deals with the structure of government 
and the relationship among its institutions should reason direct-
ly from those considerations of structure and relationship, ra-
ther than considering themselves obligated to reason only from 
the words of the Constitution’s text.136 
Examples of constitutional rules arising more from struc-
ture than from text include those regarding dormant commerce, 
state sovereign immunity, legislative delegation, commandeer-
ing, and many others, arguably including the norm of judicial 
review. To be sure, people can argue about the extent to which 
some or all of these norms are grounded in the text, and as al-
ways it is possible to find a tremendous amount in the text if one 
is willing to entertain sufficiently tendentious textual interpre-
tations. But constitutional rules like the ones listed above are 
more straightforwardly explained in structural terms, such that 
accepting the legitimacy of structural, nontextual constitutional 
authority exempts one from having to endorse awkward textual 
readings. Whether for that reason or others, the idea that struc-
ture can be a valid nontextual source of constitutional rules en-
joys widespread if quiet acceptance among leading American 
practitioners. Supreme Court justices and even Supreme Court 
majorities sometimes forthrightly acknowledge that structure 
rather than text underlies a given constitutional rule.137 
 
 134 See, for example, John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 122 Harv L Rev 2003, 2039–40 (2009) (arguing against the 
practice of recognizing constitutional structure apart from constitutional text). 
 135 See, for example, Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of Freestand-
ing Federalism, 122 Harv L Rev F 98, 103–05 (2009). 
 136 Black, Structure and Relationship at 12–13, 22–23 (cited in note 32). To be sure, 
Black often seemed to have an expansive conception of structure, as well as a heightened 
sense of how clearly that structure—or a particular view of that structure—would re-
solve a given question. 
 137 See, for example, Central Virginia Community College v Katz, 546 US 356, 375 
(2006) (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it 
says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms.”) 
(brackets in original), quoting Blatchford v Native Village of Noatak, 501 US 775, 779 
(1991); Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 905 (1997) (Scalia) (“Because there is no con-
stitutional text speaking to this precise question, the answer to the CLEOs’ challenge 
must be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Consti-
tution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court.”). To be sure, justices also sometimes deny 
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To ground a constitutional rule in considerations of struc-
ture is to justify it on a substantive basis rather than a formal 
one. A pure structural argument does not claim that some rule 
qualifies for constitutional status because it was enacted by an 
authoritative process or because it appears in an authoritative 
list of constitutional rules. Instead, the claim that a rule quali-
fies on structural grounds for constitutional status is a judgment 
that some set of facts about the institutions of government justi-
fies treating that rule in a certain way—for example, as supreme 
law, or as entrenched against revision, or as enforceable through 
the power of judicial review.138 Thus, the structural argument for 
dormant commerce doctrine relies on a judgment about the ap-
propriate roles of state governments, and the structural argu-
ment for judicial review relies on a judgment about the appro-
priate role of courts vis-à-vis other institutions in light of the 
competences and predictable pathologies of each.139 
On the big-C conception, the desirability of removing such 
substantive judgments from constitutional law is precisely why 
constitutional status should follow only from the formal criterion 
of adoption as part of the Constitution’s text. After all, the sub-
stantive judgments that underlie structural claims are things 
about which people disagree. If those judgments are permitted 
to determine what counts as a constitutional rule, the argument 
runs, the judiciary will exercise judicial review on the basis of 
subjective and contestable judgments. That argument is surely 
true, so a sophisticated small-c theorist should not contest the 
charge that recognizing structure as a source of constitutionality 
guarantees conflict about the content of constitutional law. In-
stead, the small-c theorist might point out that such conflicts 
 
the validity of putative structural rules on the grounds that the text does not support 
them. See, for example, Department of Revenue of Kentucky v Davis, 553 US 328, 361 
(2008) (Thomas concurring) (rejecting dormant commerce doctrine as having “no basis in 
the Constitution”). 
 138 An argument in favor of recognizing some structural principle as a constitutional 
rule might have a formal basis if the argument were essentially originalist. That is, one 
might argue that the principle in question is an authoritative constitutional rule because 
the Founders intended, expected, or understood it to be so, thus implicitly enacting it 
when they ratified the Constitution. In such an argument, the fact that the rule in ques-
tion is structural is incidental to its status as a constitutional rule. What qualifies the 
rule as constitutional is the authority of an original understanding. The argument about 
the Eleventh Amendment put forth in Katz and Blatchford is officially of this variety. 
See note 137.  
 139 See, for example, Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial 
Review, 121 Harv L Rev 1693, 1699–1700 (2008) (offering such an argument). 
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reflect differences of judgment that are inevitable in identifying 
constitutional rules. Indeed, such differences of judgment occur 
even when the constitutional rules in question are thought to be 
grounded in the text.140 
The idea that structure underlies the constitutional status 
of many constitutional rules is not intended to make constitu-
tional law determinate by eliminating those differences in judg-
ment. Whether or not we recognize structure as one of the bases 
for constitutionality, American legal discourse will feature a 
great deal of conflict about which rules are entitled to constitu-
tional status. The value of recognizing structure as one basis of 
constitutionality lies in clarifying the content of that struggle. 
When we argue about whether something is a constitutional 
rule, one of the things that often drives the argument is a differ-
ence in judgments about structure. 
3. Ethos. 
Small-c theories often accord constitutional status to rules 
that reflect, or that are asserted to reflect, the deep normative 
commitments that define Americans as a political community. 
This rubric is variously described in terms of fundamental prin-
ciples,141 basic national ideals,142 tradition,143 and in other ways 
as well. Adapting a term from Professor Bobbitt, I will use the 
label “ethos” to name this ground of constitutionality.144 
 
 140 Professor Charles Black put the point in the following unsubtle way: “I do not 
think I am suggesting that precision be supplanted by wide-open speculation. The preci-
sion of textual explication is nothing but specious in the areas that matter.” Black, Struc-
ture and Relationship at 29 (cited in note 32). One need not condemn all textual explica-
tion as specious in order to recognize the strength of the basic point that practitioners 
confronting structural issues are quite capable of disagreeing even where there are texts 
on point. 
 141 See, for example, Tribe, The Invisible Constitution at 128 (cited in note 86). 
 142 See, for example, Grey, 27 Stan L Rev at 706 (cited in note 7). 
 143 See, for example, Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 879, 891–94 (cited in note 15) (de-
scribing the idea of “rational traditionalism”). 
 144 See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate at 93–119 (cited in note 12). My use of the term 
is indebted to, but broader than, Professor Bobbitt’s. Professor Bobbitt uses “ethos” not 
just to name the generic idea that a conception of the values of the American polity can 
give rise to constitutional rules but to identify one particular value that he sees as gen-
erating such rules: limited government. See, for example, id at 230. For small-c theorists 
other than Professor Bobbitt, however, principles other than limited government may be 
as important to the American constitutional ethos as limited government is in Professor 
Bobbitt’s view. In my attempt to capture the conception of small-c constitutionalism 
broadly, therefore, I use the idea of ethos generically, to capture constitutional rules that 
follow from any prevailing ideas about who we are as a people and what we therefore 
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Many constitutional rules protecting individual rights are 
matters of ethos, but not every “ethical” constitutional principle 
is best characterized as a matter of individual rights. Constitu-
tional rules arising from ethos, as I am using the term, are any 
constitutional rules grounded by a deeply held set of judgments 
about the values of the American polity. There is a great deal of 
controversy over the content of those values, and that conflict 
plays out in constitutional discourse. When we argue about 
whether a public university may use race-based affirmative ac-
tion in its admissions policy, or whether a state may execute a 
criminal who committed his crimes as a child, we are arguing 
about the content of those values that comprise the American 
ethos. The winning side of such arguments has its views adopt-
ed—in whole or in part, depending on the extent of the victory—
into prevailing constitutional law. 
On a strict big-C view, of course, the only values entitled to 
constitutional status are the ones written into the text of the 
Constitution. On a small-c view, American constitutional law 
validly includes many rules whose source lies in the fact of the 
values themselves, irrespective of whether those values are re-
flected in the text of the Constitution. Many constitutional 
norms that reflect deep American values are indeed stated or at 
least gestured at in the Constitution’s text, and not just by coin-
cidence. But the small-c perspective points out that the content 
of constitutional law often tracks the content of the values more 
closely than it tracks the content of the text. For example, the 
First Amendment gives freedom of speech a place in the consti-
tutional text, but the constitutional law of free speech goes far 
beyond the text of the First Amendment. Constitutional protec-
tion of free speech runs against all government actors, even 
though the First Amendment’s guarantee is textually addressed 
only to Congress.145 Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment gives 
equality a place in the text, but the constitutional law of equal 
protection runs against the federal government even though the 
Fourteenth Amendment is textually addressed only to states.146 
Accordingly, the text reasonably authorizes the big-C theorist to 
identify free speech and equal protection as constitutional 
 
would or would not do through our political institutions, rather than only those arising 
from the specific conception of ethos that Professor Bobbitt proposes. 
 145 See, for example, Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444, 447–49 (1969) (applying free 
speech protection against a state government). 
 146 See, for example, Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena, 515 US 200, 227 (1995). 
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values, but if he wants to justify these mainstream applications 
of those principles, he must resort to creative textual readings. 
In contrast, small-c theorists can regard the constitutional val-
ues of equality and free speech as rooted at least partly in ethos 
rather than in text. The fact that the textual mentions of those 
values have narrower scope than operative constitutional law 
does not create any important problems from this perspective, 
because the text is assumed to be only one of multiple sources 
for the values. Constitutional law properly tracks the union of 
all of the sources rather than only one. 
Constitutional rules arising from ethos tend to be tied to 
narratives of American history, usually heroic ones. To return to 
the previous examples, it is no accident that free speech doctrine 
became applicable to states, and equal protection doctrine to the 
federal government, during the decades of national struggle 
against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. A sense of the 
meaning of America took shape in light of that historical chap-
ter, and that sense of the national ethos drove changes in consti-
tutional law.147 Similarly, the recent conflict over whether the 
Second Amendment confers an individual right of gun owner-
ship played out in large part as a struggle about the character of 
the society from which modern America descends.148 That said, a 
tie to a grand national narrative is not always a feature of con-
stitutional rules grounded in ethos. Lived experience can also do 
the trick. When the Supreme Court in Dickerson v United 
States149 rejected Congress’s attempt to limit the requirement of 
reading Miranda150 warnings, it did so in part because the warn-
ings had become embedded in the national culture.151 Americans 
engaged in a highly visible practice for more than a generation, 
and that practice came to shape how decisionmakers understood 
who we are as a people. 
The category of ethos has fuzzy boundaries, if it has bound-
aries at all. That fuzziness is not a defect. It is a reflection of the 
 
 147 See Primus, The American Language of Rights at 177–233 (cited in note 80). 
 148 See, for example, Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitu-
tionalism in Heller, 122 Harv L Rev 191, 194–95 (2008). 
 149 530 US 428 (2000). 
 150 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). 
 151 See Dickerson v United States (No. 99-5525) - Opinion Announcement at 00:24–
00:33 (Oyez Project 2013), online at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999 
_99_5525/opinion (visited Sept 11, 2013) (Chief Justice Rehnquist explaining, when an-
nouncing Dickerson, that the Miranda warnings “have echoed through police stations 
and on television screens in the thirty-four years since we decided the case of Miranda 
versus Arizona”). 
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social fact that the set of ideas people recognize as stating con-
stitutional principles on ethical grounds is not sharply delim-
ited. The idea of ethos, like the idea of structure, is not a criteri-
on for deciding whether a given claim about constitutional law 
should be recognized as valid. It is a generalization intended to 
capture a set of norms that many people do in practice deem 
constitutional. 
4. Judicial review. 
The judicial enforceability of constitutional rules plays a 
critical but slippery role in much small-c thinking. As on the big-
C conception, small-c constitutionalism regards many but not all 
constitutional rules as enforceable by courts exercising the pow-
er of judicial review. Indeed, whether it is appropriate to exer-
cise judicial review on the basis of rules not written in the text of 
the constitution is often the central contested question between 
big-C and small-c theorists. In such cases, justifying judicial re-
view that is not based on text is an intended payoff of small-c 
theory. 
In some important strains of small-c theory, however, judi-
cial enforceability is not only a payoff of constitutional status. It 
is also a source of that status. On Professor David Strauss’s 
model of common-law constitutionalism, for example, the pro-
cess by which judges develop reasoned understandings over time 
is itself a source of constitutional authority.152 Professor Philip 
Bobbitt’s treatment of doctrinal argument as a modality of con-
stitutional reasoning similarly treats the discourse of judges 
over time as a source of constitutional status.153 
Like a big-C theorist, a small-c theorist might point to con-
cededly legitimate exercises of judicial review as evidence that 
the rule being enforced is a constitutional rule. After all, the ar-
gument would run, judicial review can only legitimately be exer-
cised on the basis of constitutional rules. But when a big-C theo-
rist makes that inference, he implicitly (or explicitly) takes the 
legitimacy of the judicial enforcement in question as resting ul-
timately on the authority of the constitutional text. For Profes-
sor Bobbitt, and perhaps also for Professor Strauss, it may be 
unnecessary to posit an ultimate source of constitutionality prior 
to judicial behavior. Rather than taking judicial review as a 
 
 152 Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 904–05 (cited in note 15). 
 153 See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate at 39–58 (cited in note 12). 
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practice in need of external justification, these versions of small-
c constitutionalism regard judicial review as an accepted feature 
of the constitutional system.154 This does not mean, of course, 
that anything judges might choose to do would be a legitimate 
enforcement of a constitutional rule. But it does mean that judg-
es can take prior judicial discussions of constitutionality as legit-
imate sources for judicial review today, particularly if those pri-
or discussions have been widely accepted, and that judges today 
may continue the reasoned elaboration of the rules and princi-
ples that prior judges have deemed constitutional.155 Seen in this 
light, judicial review is both a payoff and a source of constitu-
tional status. 
5. Supremacy. 
Like big-C theory, small-c theory commonly regards consti-
tutional rules as supreme over nonconstitutional rules. For a 
long time, some small-c theorists commenting on instances 
where prevailing practice contradicts the written Constitution 
have accordingly concluded that the prevailing practice in ques-
tion reflects a constitutional rule and the rule written in the 
Constitution is not a constitutional rule. After all, the rule re-
flected in prevailing practice is the one that is operatively 
supreme.156 
Some small-c theorists have brought important nuances to 
the supremacy idea. For example, constitutional supremacy 
might be dimensional rather than dichotomous, with different 
kinds of constitutional rules enjoying different levels of suprem-
acy. Consider the role that Professors William Eskridge and 
John Ferejohn imagine for a category of laws called “super-
statutes.”157 In their view, these statutes are a core component of 
the small-c constitution, and they are supreme over other forms 
 
 154 See, for example, id at 237–38 (describing judicial review as a practice that is 
fundamental to the system, rather than one in need of external justification). 
 155 See Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 887, 898 (cited in note 15). 
 156 See, for example, Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution at 89–90 (cited in note 
11); Seidman, 32 Cardozo L Rev at 1154 (cited in note 70). These instances contrast with 
a different and perhaps more common attitude among people who recognize nontextual 
bases for constitutional law, which is to regard all of the text as supreme law, albeit 
without being exhaustive of the supreme law. See Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 29 
(cited in note 6). 
 157 William N. Eskridge Jr and John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L J 1215, 
1216 (2001). 
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of law but inferior to the text of the Constitution itself.158 Profes-
sor Keith Whittington’s idea of the “constitutional construction” 
also names a kind of nontextual constitutional rule that is supe-
rior to nonconstitutional law but inferior to law derived from the 
Constitution’s text.159 On these conceptions, it remains the case 
that supremacy over nonconstitutional law is a characteristic of 
constitutional rules, and there are then further considerations 
that sort out relationships of supremacy within the constitution-
al realm. 
6. Entrenchment. 
Entrenchment plays a central role in most small-c concep-
tions of constitutionality. Indeed, for some small-c theorists, en-
trenchment is close to being the essential constitutional trait.160 
But entrenchment on the small-c approach need not be en-
trenchment according to the terms of Article V.161 Indeed, it has 
become common for small-c theorists to assert that Article V’s 
vision of entrenchment is marginal to American constitutional 
law in practice, because formal amendment is rarely the real 
mechanism of constitutional change.162 
What, then, do small-c theorists mean when speaking of 
constitutional entrenchment? The answers are varied and some-
times slippery. Depending on the theory, the description of a 
rule as entrenched might mean that people generally expect the 
rule to persist for a long time,163 that people take for granted 
that the rule is settled and do not think pragmatically about its 
 
 158 See Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 8, 293 (cited in note 9); 
Eskridge and Ferejohn, 50 Duke L J at 1217 (cited note 157). 
 159 Whittington, Constitutional Construction at 2 (cited in note 12). 
 160 See, for example, Seidman, 32 Cardozo L Rev at 1147–48 (cited in note 70); 
Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 22 (cited in note 16). 
 161 Simultaneously asserting that entrenchment is key to constitutionality and that 
Article V is not the exclusive form of constitutional entrenchment has been a feature of 
small-c theory for a very long time. See, for example, Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 21–
22 (cited in note 16) (describing “highly probable permanence” as an “essential criterion” 
of constitutionality and, on the previous page, describing the idea that Article V amend-
ment is the chief process of constitutional change as “superstitions”). 
 162 See, for example, Strauss, 114 Harv L Rev at 1459 (cited in note 50); Ackerman, 
120 Harv L Rev at 1767 (cited in note 32) (arguing that the normal mode of constitution-
al change is presidential leadership and that the Reconstruction Amendments were nec-
essary only because of the unusual circumstance that an accidental President—Andrew 
Johnson—opposed the dominant party’s program of reform). 
 163 See, for example, Munro, The Makers of the Unwritten Constitution at 8–9 (cited 
in note 48). 
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costs and benefits,164 that even the rule’s former opponents now 
regard it as beyond partisan debate,165 or that a popular consen-
sus holds that the rule is a good one.166 These formulations are 
all distinct. For any combination of them, we could identify ex-
amples of rules that would be entrenched on one conception but 
not on others. That said, the formulations are also largely over-
lapping as applied to actual rules, such that many rules could be 
described as entrenched for more than one of these reasons. 
Entrenchment conceived in any of these ways is a matter of 
degree rather than a binary condition. Along any of these di-
mensions, a rule can be more or less entrenched. According to 
some small-c theorists, the degree of a rule’s entrenchment mir-
rors the degree of its constitutionality. Very entrenched rules 
are very constitutional, and rules that are only somewhat en-
trenched are less so.167 And a complete picture of entrenchment 
would have to account for the fact that a given rule might enjoy 
different degrees of entrenchment for several different kinds of 
entrenchment. One rule might be very entrenched in the sense 
that people take its settlement for granted but less entrenched 
in the sense of being supported on its merits by popular consen-
sus; another rule might exhibit the opposite combination. To 
take the measure of a rule’s entrenchment, therefore, it is neces-
sary to ask not just “How much?” but “How much of each kind?” 
If entrenchment is conceived in these terms, then there is no 
formal process that can be guaranteed to entrench a rule. 
Whether a rule is entrenched is partly a matter of attitudes and 
partly a matter of the practical obstacles to doing without the 
rule. To be sure, one can identify processes that might bring 
about the attitudes and practical circumstances that would 
make a rule entrenched. If the rule is endorsed by respected per-
sons and institutions, or if persuasive arguments are made for 
it, or if the right people come to regard it as in their interests, 
then enough of the necessary people may develop the requisite 
attitudes for that rule to become entrenched. Similarly, the 
world might be structured so as to make repudiation of a rule ex-
tremely costly, whether deliberately or otherwise. Entrenchment 
 
 164 See, for example, Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 26–27 (cited in note 16). 
 165 See Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 114 (cited in note 9); 
Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations at 10–11 (cited in note 86). 
 166 See Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 13 (cited in note 9). 
 167 See, for example, Seidman, 32 Cardozo L Rev at 1148 (cited in note 70); Llewel-
lyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 30 (cited in note 16). 
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might in some cases be fostered simply by a rule’s longevity, if 
people come to take the rule for granted or to order their affairs 
around it, thus becoming invested in its continuance.168 But no 
set of steps can be guaranteed to entrench a rule to any particu-
lar degree, because there is no formal process that can be guar-
anteed either to bring about a particular set of attitudes in the 
population or to forestall decisionmakers’ willingness to incur 
the practical costs of change. 
B. Several Bundles 
No small-c theory holds that every constitutional proposi-
tion exhibits all six aspects of constitutionality described above. 
The essential move of small-c theory, after all, is the denial that 
one of those aspects—textuality—is necessary for a rule to enjoy 
constitutional status. Nor do small-c theories characteristically 
insist that all constitutional rules display all of the other fea-
tures associated with constitutionality. But small-c theories 
have assembled bundles of their own from within the universe of 
constitutional characteristics. Classic small-c writers like Pro-
fessors Charles Black, Thomas Grey, and Philip Bobbitt con-
ceived of constitutionality as a status that bundles structure or 
ethos (or both) with judicial review.169 On their view, rules with 
appropriate structural or ethical content are constitutional 
rules, and as constitutional rules they are entitled to judicial en-
forcement. More recently, some of the most influential small-c 
literature has developed a conception of nontextual constitu-
tionality that bundles structure and ethos with supremacy and 
entrenchment but pointedly not with judicial review. Prominent 
theorists working in this vein include Professors William 
Eskridge, John Ferejohn, and Keith Whittington.170 
Each of those conceptions has offered a solution to a promi-
nent problem. Classic small-c writers strove to make it possible 
to speak openly about nontextual judicial review as a legitimate 
aspect of constitutional decisionmaking, rather than leaving it 
 
 168 See Levinson, 124 Harv L Rev at 707 (cited in note 9). 
 169 See Black, Structure and Relationship at 11 (cited in note 32) (structure); Grey, 
27 Stan L Rev at 706 (cited in note 7) (ethos); Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate at 93–96 (cited 
in note 12) (both). 
 170 See Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Origi-
nal Intent, and Judicial Review 5–7, 11–13, 79 (Kansas 1999); Eskridge and Ferejohn, A 
Republic of Statutes at 1–2, 7–8 (cited in note 9). 
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in the shadows as a practice that dare not speak its name.171 As 
we all know, that effort was not wholly successful. The legitima-
cy of nontextual judicial review remains hotly contested, and 
even many people who are not hard-line textualists are inclined 
to minimize its role. In part, serious discomfort with nontextual 
judicial review persists because of anxiety that nontextual judi-
cial review means license for judges to impose their subjective 
views on the polity, rather than remaining faithful to an objec-
tive authority worthy of being called law.172 The more recent 
wave of small-c writing offers to solve that problem. By retain-
ing the idea that constitutional rules can arise from sources oth-
er than the text but reserving judicial review for constitutional 
rules that are textual, these theorists make it possible to think 
about important facets of structure and ethos and supremacy 
and entrenchment without stoking controversy over nontextual 
judicial review. 
Unfortunately, each of these efforts exhibits the problems 
with constitutional bundling. In different ways, each obscures 
the complexity of constitutional law by imagining constitutional-
ity as a status with known payoffs that follow from known bases. 
Professors Black, Grey, and Bobbitt wrote as if their bases for 
constitutional status made rules fit for judicial review, when in 
fact they do so only sometimes. Professors Eskridge, Ferejohn, 
and Whittington purport to sort the bases of constitutionality in-
to those that yield judicial review and those that do not, but in 
practice the different elements of constitutionality often combine 
in ways that their models cannot accommodate. Albeit with dif-
ferent sticks from those used in the simple big-C bundle, these 
small-c theorists repeat the mistake of imagining constitutional-
ity as a consistently bundled status. 
1. Classic bundles: justifying judicial review. 
The tendency to treat constitutionality as a status with a 
bundled set of criteria and payoffs is a prominent feature of 
classic small-c writing. In particular, much of that literature 
presents the nontextual bases of constitutional status as 
 
 171 See, for example, Black, Structure and Relationship at 31 (cited in note 32) (sug-
gesting that structural interpretation “be brought more clearly into the conscious field”); 
Grey, 27 Stan L Rev at 706 (cited in note 7) (lamenting the tendency of judges to hide 
their nontextual reasoning). 
 172 See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 43–72 (cited in note 7) (criticizing nontexual 
judicial review). 
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foundations for the payoff of judicial review.173 The basic argu-
ment of Professor Charles Black’s Structure and Relationship in 
Constitutional Law, for example, is that the source of many im-
portant constitutional rules is structural rather than textual 
and that those rules, being constitutional rules, should be con-
sidered supreme, entrenched, and valid subjects for enforcement 
through the exercise of judicial review.174 Professor Black took 
judicial review to be a payoff of constitutional status, so his con-
clusion that a certain set of nontextual rules can be enforced 
through judicial review follows if he can establish structure as a 
source of that status. Professor Thomas Grey’s Do We Have an 
Unwritten Constitution? has a parallel shape, but with ethos ra-
ther than structure as the criterion for constitutionality. Profes-
sor Grey argued that American law has long regarded a set of 
“basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair treatment” as 
protected by unwritten constitutional rules that it is the judici-
ary’s role to enforce.175 Professor Philip Bobbitt’s Constitutional 
Fate follows both of these leads, identifying both structure and 
ethos as sources of constitutional authority.176 And as Professor 
Bobbitt explains, the point of identifying sources of constitution-
al authority—at least in Constitutional Fate—is to understand 
the practice of judicial review.177 
Professors Black, Grey, and Bobbitt wrote during a fifteen-
year period that followed the heyday of the Warren Court and 
that included the decision in Roe v Wade.178 The practice of non-
textual judicial review came under trenchant attack in those 
years,179 and it should not be surprising that leading small-c 
 
 173 To be sure, some leading small-c thinkers have had the opposite project: Profes-
sors Karl Llewellyn and Bruce Ackerman have both advanced theories of constitutionali-
ty arguing for the disentrenchment of norms that would otherwise be considered formal-
ly entrenched and eligible for judicial protection. Professor Llewellyn’s The Constitution 
as an Institution, published in 1934, was an argument for letting the elected branches 
make far-reaching changes in federal governance without judicial interference, and Pro-
fessor Ackerman’s We the People is in large part a defense of the judges’ having gotten 
out of the way of that reform program. See Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 21–23 (cited in 
note 16); Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations at 99–119 (cited in note 86).  
 174 See Black, Structure and Relationship at 11, 15 (cited in note 32). 
 175 See Grey, 27 Stan L Rev at 706 (cited in note 7). 
 176 See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate at 74–122 (cited in note 12). 
 177 See id at 3, 233. 
 178 Roe, 410 US at 152–54. 
 179 See, for example, Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment 1–8 (Harvard 1977); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and 
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind L J 1, 1 (1971). See also Ely, Democracy and 
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thinkers set about arguing that constitutional law properly un-
derstood provided justifications for judicial review in defense of 
rules beyond those written in the text. That said, the practice of 
understanding constitutionality as a bundled status within 
which nontextual criteria justify the payoff of judicial review 
was a common feature of small-c writing long before the Warren 
Court. To cite just one example, Professor Christopher 
Tiedeman’s The Unwritten Constitution of the United States ap-
peared in 1890, focused on structure as the source of constitu-
tionality, and argued that one of the most important features of 
the idea that some rules have constitutional status is its ability 
to legitimize the exercise of judicial review, including judicial 
review on behalf of individual rights not written into the 
document.180 
Assuming that prevailing practice is a decent guide to legit-
imate behavior, theorists like these were right to insist that 
many structural and ethical rules are appropriate subjects of ju-
dicial review, whether or not those rules can be found in the 
text. As discussed above, settled constitutional law is shot 
through with nontextual rules.181 Again, one can minimize or 
even deny that fact if one is willing to indulge sufficiently crea-
tive readings of text, but that strategy sacrifices most of what is 
supposed to make textualism valuable. 
It is misleading, though, to explain nontextual judicial re-
view by saying that structural and ethical propositions are enti-
tled to judicial enforcement because they are constitutional. If 
that explanation seems sensible, it is because we are accustomed 
to assuming that constitutional rules, as such, are fit for judicial 
review. And we are so accustomed. But that may be largely be-
cause the vision of big-C constitutionalism continues to be influ-
ential, even for people who consciously reject the notion that all 
constitutional rules are in the text. The big-C vision holds that 
the text is the valid basis for judicial review. If all constitutional 
rules are textual, it follows easily that constitutional rules are 
per se valid subjects of judicial review. But if the category of 
“constitutional rules” includes nontextual rules rooted in structure 
 
Distrust at 43–72 (cited in note 7) (recognizing the limits of pure textualism but criticiz-
ing the idea that judicial review should enforce nontextual fundamental values). 
 180 See Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution at 42–44, 47–49, 67–82, 163 (cited in 
note 11). Professor Tiedeman knew nothing of the Warren Court, of course. For him, a 
leading example of sound judicial review without textual warrant was the Court’s deci-
sion in Slaughter-House. See id at 102–09. 
 181 See Part I.A. 
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or ethos, a rule’s constitutionality will indicate its eligibility for 
judicial review only if we have separately shown that rules root-
ed in structure or ethos are valid subjects of judicial review. 
Without that showing, justifying those payoffs on the ground 
that structural or ethical content makes a rule “constitutional” 
might be an analytic error or a rhetorical trick. 
To be clear, the missing showing about why a rule’s struc-
tural or ethical content warrants judicial review need not—
indeed, should not—be an explanation for why all structural and 
ethical rules are judicially enforceable. Textual rules are not all 
judicially enforceable, and there is little reason to think that 
other kinds of constitutional rules would uniformly be. As a mat-
ter of prevailing practice, only some structural propositions, and 
only some ethical ones, are treated as judicially enforceable. 
Dormant commerce doctrine is built on structural propositions, 
but the rule setting the size of the House of Representatives is 
also a structural rule, and indeed a rule that prominent small-c 
theorists have identified as constitutional in their sense,182 but 
no court would invalidate a statute doubling the size of the 
House. 
There could of course be sound reasons for having judges en-
force some structural rules but not others. The federal judiciary 
might be well positioned to strike down protectionist state legis-
lation but have no good basis for deciding whether the House of 
Representatives should have 435 members or 500. Similarly, 
unelected judges might be better than legislatures at applying 
ethical principles of individual liberty to concrete situations 
where majority sentiment or the general welfare seem to point 
in the other direction, even if legislatures are at least as well po-
sitioned as courts to reflect and formulate national values in the 
long run. Without attempting to go deeply into how these prin-
ciples might apply, one can say that it makes sense to allocate 
decisionmaking on the basis of institutional-competence consid-
erations like these.183 
Whether or not institutional competence is the chosen 
framework, the small-c constitutionalist needs some criteria for 
determining which propositions, out of the universe of structural 
 
 182 See, for example, Whittington, Constitutional Construction at 12 (cited in note 
12). 
 183 That people will disagree about how to apply such institutional-competence cri-
teria does not differentiate those criteria from any other criteria that could plausibly be 
used instead. 
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and ethical norms, are the ones that can be enforced by judicial 
review. And it would make little sense to say that the judicially 
enforceable rules are the constitutional ones. That statement 
might simply collapse constitutionality into fitness for judicial 
review, such that characterization of a rule as constitutional 
would announce rather than explain its judicial enforceability. 
Or else it would pretend to give a reason while actually begging 
the question, and it would do so by trading on the notion of con-
stitutionality as a bundle of characteristics that travel together, 
one of which is judicial review. That notion cannot withstand 
close scrutiny. The characteristics we associate with constitu-
tionality often travel separately, and reasons are needed to ex-
plain why particular rules exhibiting some of those characteris-
tics should be treated as if they also had others. 
2. Split bundles: ducking judicial review. 
The tendency to theorize constitutionality as a bundle of cri-
teria and payoffs has also appeared in the work of small-c schol-
ars with a very different set of attitudes toward judicial review. 
As is widely understood, the idea of nontextual constitutional 
rules commonly provokes the anxiety that courts will have no 
sound way of knowing which rules they are authorized to en-
force.184 That anxiety often pushes people back to big-C constitu-
tionalism, or at least to something near it.185 Recently, however, 
a number of leading theorists have found another alternative. 
They recognize a realm of nontextual constitutional law but re-
serve judicial review for constitutional rules that are textual. In 
other words, they take the set of constitutional traits and as-
semble them into not one bundle but two. 
Consider a framework developed by Professor Keith Whit-
tington. In a body of writing put forth over a period of several 
years, Professor Whittington distinguished constitutional rules 
rooted in the text, which he called “interpretations,” from non-
textual constitutional rules, which he called “constructions.”186 
 
 184 See text accompanying note 179. 
 185 Professor Bobbitt’s narrative of the rising influence of Justice Hugo Black as a 
response to the apparent nontextual judging of the midcentury Court offers an exempla-
ry illustration. In Professor Bobbitt’s telling, it was precisely the worry that the midcen-
tury Court lacked firm and objective bases for its exercises of judicial review that make 
Justice Black’s endorsement of simple textualism seem so compelling. See Bobbitt, Con-
stitutional Fate at 29–33 (cited in note 12).  
 186 See, for example, Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation at 5–7, 11–13, 79 
(cited in note 170). 
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Constitutional constructions, Professor Whittington explained, 
set important ground rules for legal and political behavior on 
matters of structure and ethos in areas where the constitutional 
text is silent or ambiguous. For example, Professor Whittington 
says that the rule whereby the Supreme Court has nine justices 
is a constitutional construction, as is the freezing of the number 
of members of House of Representatives at 435 and the rule that 
these Representatives shall be elected from single-member dis-
tricts.187 In ways like these, Professor Whittington says, a small-
c constitution consequentially shapes American government. 
But in Professor Whittington’s view, the constructions that com-
prise the small-c constitution are a second-class form of constitu-
tional law. They may not conflict with the text of the big-C Con-
stitution. They validly operate only in areas that the big-C text 
leaves open. And perhaps most importantly, judges may exercise 
judicial review only on the basis of big-C constitutional text.188 
This framework groups the various attributes of constitu-
tionality into two separate bundles. One bundle includes text, 
supremacy, Article V entrenchment, and judicial review. That is 
the realm of what Professor Whittington calls “constitutional in-
terpretation.” The other bundle, which is “constitutional con-
struction,” includes structure, ethos, and a de facto form of en-
trenchment, by which is meant that constitutional constructions 
have greater staying power than ordinary laws do. (To be clear, 
“interpretations” as well as “constructions” regularly concern 
structure and ethos. But what makes constitutional interpreta-
tions interpretations is their textuality.) There is nuance here, 
and the rubric is deservedly influential. Note, however, that this 
theory of nontextual constitutionalism has no place for nontex-
tual judicial review, indeed emphatically not. By segregating the 
judicial-review aspect of constitutionality from the nontextual 
bases of constitutionality, Professor Whittington creates a sys-
tem that acknowledges the value of thinking about nontextual 
propositions as “constitutional” but maintains big-C ideas about 
the relationship between text and judicial review. 
Small-c constitutionalism has a similar limit in the writings 
of Professors William Eskridge and John Ferejohn. In their 
view, many federal statutes enjoy constitutional status in a 
small-c sense. Examples include the Administrative Procedure 
 
 187 See Whittington, Constitutional Construction at 12 (cited in note 12). 
 188 See Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation at 6 (cited in note 170). 
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Act,189 the Voting Rights Act,190 and the Clean Air191 and Clean 
Water Acts.192 Such statutes structure lawmaking and other 
governmental processes, and they reflect deeply and widely held 
normative views, and they are relatively entrenched against 
change—not formally entrenched, but practically entrenched, 
because the norms they embody enjoy wide and deep support.193  
The idea of laws that are statutory in form but constitution-
al in essence is a deeply small-c idea, and Professors Eskridge 
and Ferejohn present it forthrightly as such. They contend, and 
reasonably, that a small-c constitutional framework is far better 
than the big-C framework for understanding the important 
workings of modern American government.194 Professors 
Eskridge and Ferejohn are careful to say, though, that small-c 
constitutional statutes cannot override the big-C constitutional 
text.195 And though the norms that constitutional statutes em-
body might color judicial interpretations of the big-C Constitu-
tion, the courts may not exercise the power of judicial review on 
the basis of a statute—not even a constitutional statute.196 
Like Professor Whittington, Professors Eskridge and Fere-
john deflate the worry that nontextual constitutionalism invites 
overly subjective exercises of judicial review by grouping the 
properties of constitutionality into two different bundles. Textu-
al propositions are formally supreme, formally entrenched, and 
legitimate bases for judicial review. Nontextual constitutional 
propositions enjoy whatever level of practical entrenchment 
arises from the consensus that supports them. We can think of 
this approach as a hybrid of big-C and small-c theories. Yes, 
these theorists say, we have a small-c constitution, and that fact 
is important in the operation of American government. But the 
 
 189 Pub L No 79-404, ch 324, 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sec-
tions of Title 5. See also Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 10–11 (cited in 
note 9). 
 190 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437 (1965), codified as amended at 42 USC § 1971 et 
seq. See also Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 88–89 (cited in note 9). 
 191 Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub L No 88-206, 77 Stat 392, codified at 42 USC § 7401 
et seq. See also Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 256 (cited in note 9). 
 192 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub L No 92-500, 86 
Stat 816, codified at 33 USC § 1251 et seq. See Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of 
Statutes at 256 (cited in note 9). 
 193 See Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 13 (cited in note 9). 
 194 See, for example, Eskridge, 41 UC Davis L Rev at 5–6 (cited in note 132). 
 195 See, for example, Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 1, 8 (cited in 
note 9). 
 196 See id. 
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written Constitution still has the status that big-C theory has 
traditionally claimed. 
This hybrid approach is in some ways a clever attempt to 
sidestep central problems in both big-C and small-c theory, ra-
ther than a solution to those problems. Professors Eskridge, 
Ferejohn, and Whittington acknowledge and develop the small-c 
idea that American law has a category of rules on structural and 
ethical subjects that seem to be regarded as more powerful or 
more fundamental than other, ordinary rules, albeit without ap-
pearing in the written Constitution. But these theorists decline 
to wrestle with a central claim of small-c theory, namely that 
nontextual constitutional rules can be as authoritative, as en-
trenched, and as much the subject of judicial review as any rule 
that does appear in the written Constitution. Professor Whit-
tington expressly insists that judicial review may proceed only 
on the basis of written constitutional rules; Professors Eskridge 
and Ferejohn say much the same thing, albeit in softer voices. In 
short, these theorists are tied to a big-C conception of judicial 
review. And as described above, that conception is inconsistent 
with prevailing practice. To be sure, the hybrid approach should 
mitigate the anxiety that other forms of small-c theory often 
provoke about subjective exercises of judicial review. But it does 
so by denying the major flaw in big-C theory that small-c theory 
comes to correct, namely the claim that textuality and judicial 
review must always be bundled together. 
By carving the attributes of constitutionality into two do-
mains, the hybrid theorists execute a partial unbundling of con-
stitutionality. That is an advance over a fully bundled picture of 
constitutional law: it permits us to see that constitutional rules 
come in different kinds. But the proposed division between the 
two domains is itself a misleading form of bundling. It denies 
the broader range of mix-and-match combinations that actually 
manifest themselves in practice. 
3. Repositioning judicial review. 
Finally, consider the work of Professor David Strauss. In a 
considerable body of work, Professor Strauss has developed the 
argument that American practice regards constitutional law 
largely as a body of judicial doctrine that evolves over time in 
the way that other bodies of common law do, albeit with 
some influence around the edges from the text of the written 
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Constitution.197 Professor Strauss’s is a thoroughly small-c view. 
He sees relatively little constitutional law as flowing from the 
text,198 and he understands constitutional change to be a process 
that usually takes place without the text’s being formally 
amended.199 But although he sees more routes to constitutional 
change than are imagined in Article V, Professor Strauss under-
stands resistance to easy change as one of the central virtues of 
constitutional law. Indeed, much of the point of constitutional 
law for Professor Strauss is the entrenchment of desirable legal 
norms against the pathologies and misjudgments of politics.200 
The norms that Professor Strauss sees as healthily entrenched 
tend to sound in structure or ethos, and—not surprisingly—
judicial review is for Professor Strauss a major mechanism of 
their entrenchment. Professor Strauss adheres powerfully to the 
view that the content of constitutional law changes with prevail-
ing societal attitudes,201 so the entrenchment he seeks is only 
relative. Still, Professor Strauss sees resistance to the excesses 
of short-term political decisionmaking as a key virtue of consti-
tutional law. His writing aims in large part to explain the legit-
imacy of judicial review as a mechanism of that resistance. And, 
of course, it seeks to do so without recourse to the major big-C 
ideas about the status of the text, which Professor Strauss re-
gards as fallacies. 
Professor Strauss accordingly presents a picture of judicial 
decisionmaking on which judicial review is exercised on behalf of 
a set of relatively knowable principles. Crucially, a large part of 
the knowability of the principles arises from the judicial process 
itself. Like common-law judges in other legal fields, Professor 
Strauss says, judges in constitutional cases reason from princi-
ples previously articulated by other judges.202 The application of 
those principles sometimes calls for change in the forms of modi-
fication, clarification, or other kinds of tweaking.203 Sometimes, 
judges engage in a larger kind of change, if a previously articulated 
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 199 See Strauss, 114 Harv L Rev at 1457–58 (cited in note 50). 
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Rev at 1459 (cited in note 50). 
 202 Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 879, 886–87 (cited in note 15). 
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idea now appears obviously and grievously wrong, but such cas-
es are exceptional.204 Throughout, the underlying sources of the 
constitutional law that judges apply include longstanding prac-
tices, the nature of society’s fundamental political institutions, 
and judicial precedents that have been accepted over time and 
which reflect and codify those underlying sources.205 The long ac-
ceptance of an important practice or principle—or, perhaps even 
more so, of a judicial precedent articulating such a practice or 
principle—indicates that the practice, principle, or precedent en-
joys constitutional status. Some such things, Professor Strauss 
says, “are every bit as much a part of the Constitution as the 
most explicit textual provision.”206 In light of that constitutional 
status, those practices, principles, and precedents are fit to be 
defended by the exercise of judicial review. 
As a descriptive account of American practice, Professor 
Strauss’s common-law vision has enormous strengths. And to 
the extent that that account is accurate, it should deflate—if not 
completely allay—concerns about runaway judges who, unteth-
ered by text, will second-guess democratic lawmaking on the ba-
sis of their subjective whims. If courts exercise judicial review on 
the basis of longstanding accepted principles, and if change oc-
curs only (or even mostly) incrementally and only (or even most-
ly) when it is clearly indicated, then constitutional judging is not 
as freewheeling as might be feared. 
For present purposes, however, it is important to pay close 
attention not just to the account Professor Strauss gives of judi-
cial review but to the relationship his approach posits between 
judicial review and constitutional status. Common-law constitu-
tionalism as Professor Strauss presents it partially repositions 
judicial review within the constitutional bundle. Rather than 
seeing judicial review solely as a payoff of constitutional status, 
common-law constitutionalism understands judicial review as a 
basis for that status. Many propositions earn their constitution-
al status precisely because they have been adopted by judges ex-
ercising the power of judicial review and the resulting judg-
ments have been steadily reaffirmed over time. That 
constitutional status, once established, seems to solidify the le-
gitimacy of judicial review for the relevant propositions. Judicial 
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review is appropriate in these circumstances, Professor Strauss 
tells us, because the principles on behalf of which judicial review 
is exercised are constitutional principles, if we understand con-
stitutionality correctly.207 
That move in the argument is worth a little bit of scrutiny. 
What, exactly, does calling a certain set of nontextual proposi-
tions “constitutional” add to the claim that they are fit subjects 
for judicial review because they are long-accepted judgments 
that have been reaffirmed over time, reaffirmed in particular 
through the practice of judicial review itself? One reason to de-
ploy the characterization “constitutional” when describing such 
propositions is that reasonable communication sometimes calls 
for shorthands. But that may not be the only reason, or even the 
principal reason, why Professor Strauss’s theory presents itself 
as an account of constitutionality, rather than just an argument 
about a complex set of factors that justify the exercise of judicial 
review. 
Within the discourse of constitutional law, establishing that 
a rule has constitutional status is generally tantamount to per-
suading one’s audience that that rule is supreme, entrenched, 
and enforceable through judicial review. This is a matter of hab-
its of thought. To the question “Why can courts enforce that rule 
in the face of a contrary legislative decision?” the answer “Be-
cause that rule is a constitutional rule” is presumed to be suffi-
cient. But on reflection, that answer is only sufficient if there is 
some reason why all rules called “constitutional” are entitled to 
supremacy, entrenchment, and judicial review. If one already 
thinks that the long acceptance of some structural or ethical 
proposition is sufficient justification for judges to treat that 
proposition as judicially enforceable, the label “constitutional” is 
a convenient shorthand. But if one is skeptical of that claim, one 
should be no less skeptical after the label “constitutional” is 
applied. 
My argument is not that we need a theory of constitutionali-
ty that will answer the hard questions about the criteria for su-
premacy, entrenchment and judicial review. It is that we should 
not turn to a theory of constitutionality to answer those ques-
tions. Most helpfully understood, “constitutionality” is a short-
hand for several overlapping but differentiable constellations of 
properties, and no account of bases and payoffs can be accurate 
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as applied to all of the different configurations. Some proposi-
tions that are in the text are structural, and some are ethical, 
and some are both, and perhaps some are neither, and some but 
not all are supreme or entrenched, and some but not all are fit 
subjects for judicial review. Some structural propositions and 
some ethical propositions are properly regarded as supreme, or 
as entrenched, and some are not; some are fit subjects for judi-
cial review, and some are not.  
A general theory of constitutionality will not tell us which 
are which. For that task, we need separate theories that deal di-
rectly with the different sticks in the bundle. For example, a 
theory that could guide the exercise of judicial review might of-
fer an account of the substantive virtues and vices of that prac-
tice in light of what we know about the behavior of courts, the 
behavior of other governmental decisionmakers, and the aims 
and values of American government. Obviously, such a theory 
would have many contestable elements, and it is fanciful to im-
agine that practitioners of constitutional law would ever reach 
full agreement on the relevant questions. But at least such a 
theory would be trying to answer the right questions. Trying to 
settle the question by reference to the category of constitutionali-
ty would beg those questions—and it might be no less contentious. 
CONCLUSION 
“Constitutional” is a term of approbation. We use it to mark 
rules, principles, and values as having an exalted status. But 
the attributes of that status vary, such that establishing the 
constitutionality of a rule does not reliably establish much else. 
It may imply that the rule is textual, or supreme, or entrenched, 
or enforceable through judicial review, and often those implica-
tions will be borne out. But often they will be misleading. To 
think clearly about a rule, it is important to focus on the sepa-
rate sticks in the constitutional bundle more than on the ques-
tion of constitutionality itself. Answering that question may not 
tell us what we need to know. And when describing a rule as 
“constitutional,” it would often be helpful to specify the sense in 
which the term is meant. 
One might wonder whether this analysis suggests that we 
should strive to avoid the term “constitutional” and instead al-
ways speak directly about the separate substantive attributes to 
which that label points. I do not think that conclusion follows. 
Like many other terms that name a variety of different but 
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related things, “constitutional” is a reasonable shorthand much 
of the time. The task before the analyst who would think clearly 
about the set of things that “constitutional” names is to avoid 
mistaking the shorthand for a fully specified concept. Besides, 
any recommendation that American lawyers purge the word 
“constitutional” from their vocabularies would be quixotic. The 
term is deeply embedded within our discourse, and the practi-
tioner who tried to do without it would be committing malprac-
tice. Whatever its ambiguities, the description of a rule as con-
stitutional carries a claim, or at least a strong implication, of 
exalted status, and in an adversarial profession it is unwise to 
unilaterally disarm oneself of potent rhetorical tools. And in a 
different vein, the methodological commitments of my analysis 
suggest that the idea of a bundled status called “constitutionali-
ty” is a social fact to be taken seriously, even if the ostensible 
content of that idea gives way under scrutiny. After all, my 
analysis is committed to observing the practice of constitutional 
law as it actually operates. The propensity to bundle the attrib-
utes of constitutionality—even if only by creative interpretation 
and other forms of legerdemain—is a robust feature of the prac-
tice of constitutional law, no less so than the reality that many 
constitutional rules lack one or more of those attributes when 
carefully considered. Learning to see unbundled constitutional 
rules is an advance over seeing them only in a simpler way. But 
the unbundled perspective is not the end of the matter, because 
the practice sets value on treating constitutionality as bundled. 
So the constitutional lawyer must be able to rebundle constitu-
tionality as well as to unbundle it, and he must know when—or 
in what role—to do which. 
Exploring the precise dynamics by which prevailing practice 
strives to maintain constitutionality as a bundled status seems 
like a fruitful project for another paper. In closing this one, and 
perhaps to suggest a bridge to that other inquiry, I offer one fi-
nal set of observations. 
Strictly speaking, none of the attributes associated with 
constitutionality necessarily entails any of the others. But there 
are some patterns. Above, I noted that structure and ethos are 
categories into which many rules regarded as constitutional fall, 
rather than criteria that qualify rules as constitutional. Which 
structural and ethical norms should be deemed supreme or en-
trenched or judicially reviewable is a hard question, one that I 
do not think can be answered wholesale. It is generally the case, 
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though, that if a structural or ethical proposition is regarded as 
supreme or as entrenched—whether in the Article V sense or 
less formally, meaning that it is treated as not to be revised in 
the ordinary course—it is likely to be called a constitutional 
rule. And once we think of it as a constitutional rule, we may 
come to associate it with the text of the Constitution, even if 
competent readers of English lacking awareness of the proposi-
tion would not find it in the text. 
Consider some illustrative examples. Only after deci-
sionmakers developed the substantive intuition that free speech 
should run against the states and equal protection against the 
federal government did the textual devices of incorporation and 
reverse incorporation come to seem natural. Something similar 
may be happening today with the anticommandeering rule, as it 
shifts from a nontextual principle to an interpretation of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.208 In other words, once constitu-
tionality is established, rules may move along the continuum of 
textuality described above.209 Rules that were once recognized as 
nontextual may become associated with particular clauses by 
virtue of official stories, and rules that are associated with 
clauses by virtue of official stories may so color our intuitions 
about the text that we come to think of the rules as fairly im-
plied by the text rather than merely associated with it. As an of-
ficial matter, of course, textuality is the paradigmatic basis of 
constitutional status. But in circumstances like these, textuality 
is a payoff rather than a source. 
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